Of the Immortality of Man's Soul and the Nature of It and Other Spirits

OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS; ESPECIALLY MANS SOUL.

In a placid Collation with the Learned Dr. Henry More, In a Reply to his Anſwer to a private Letter, Printed in his ſecond Edition of Mr. Glanviles Sadduceiſmus Triumphatus.

By Richard Baxter.

LONDON, Printed for B. Simmons, at the Three Golden Cocks at the Weſt End of St. Pauls. 1682.

A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Henry More at Chriſts-Colledge in Cambridge.

Reverend Sir,

I Had anſwered your deſire ſooner, but having lent out the Sadduc. Triumph. I ſtaid till now to have [•]ad it returned (being loth to buy another, it coſting me 6s.) But I was fain to get another at laſt, and [•]n the review I find that I have ex[•]reſly given you my thoughts already [•]f your notion of a Spirit in my Methodus, having noted it in your Book of Atheiſm, and your Ench. Metaphyſ. In ſhort. 1. I think you and I are agreed that we cannot conceive of a Spirit unico conceptu, but muſt have two inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Gliſſon De Vita naturae, calls conceptus fundamentalis, and is that which we call Subſtantia: for we can ſcarce think of a Virtus formalis, which is not ſubſtantiae alicujus virtus, but qua virtus ſimpliciter exiſteth of itſelf; (unleſs we muſt ſo think with ſome of God.) And though this maketh not an actual compoſition, as Matter and Form in mixtis, yet intellectually we muſt take it as a diſtinct inadequate conceptus.

The other inadequate conceptus i[•] Formal; and I think you and I ar[•] agreed that this is Virtus Una-trina[•] as deſcribed by me, viz. Virtus V[••]talis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva[•] appetitiva, as Dr. Gliſſon ſpeaks (of which I make three ſpecies a[•] deſcribed.) And I am my ſelf fa[•] better acquainted with the nature [•] a Spirit by the eſſential Virtus formalis, known to us by its acts; (for nothing doth that which it cannot do) than from the notion of ſubſtantiality. And yet I dare not ſay that a ſelf-moving principle is proper to a Spirit. Nor do I conſent to Campanella de ſenſu rerum, and Dr Gliſſon that would make all things alive by an eſſentiating form in the very Elements.

I diſtinguiſh Natures into Active and Paſſive; and Paſſivity is a word that ſerveth me as well as materiality: But whence the Deſcenſus gravium is, I deſpair of knowing; and if it be of an innate principle, I call it not therefore a Spirit, becauſe it is but paſſivorum motus aggregativus ad unionem in quiete, when Spirits motion is vital and ſo eſſential to them, that they tend not to union in quieſcence, but in everlaſting activity; quieſcence in inactivity, being as much againſt their nature as motion againſt a Stones. So that I think we are agreed of the formal notice of a Spirit in general, and of an intellective, ſenſitive, and vegetative in ſpecie.

But truly I am at a loſs about the conceptus fundamentalis, wherein the true difference lieth between Subſtantia and Materia. Do we by—Subſtantia mean a conceptus realis, or only Relative. To ſay it doth ſubſtare accidentibus, ſpeaks but a Relation directly, and leaves the queſtion unanſwered, Quid eſt quod ſubſtat accidentibus. To ſay it is not an Accident, tells us not what it is, but what it is not. To ſay it doth ſubſiſt per ſe, either ſaith no more than that it is Ens reale, or elſe tells us not what it is that doth ſubſiſt. Quoad notationem nominis diſtinct from uſe▪ doth not materia and ſubſtantia ſignify the ſame fundamental conceptus? And is not the form the notifying difference? You difference Subſtance and Matter antecedently to the formal difference by Penetrability & Impenetrability, Indiviſibility & Diviſibility. But 1. I deſpair knowing in this life, how far Spiritual Subſtances are penetrable and indiviſible. I grant you ſuch an extenſion as ſhall free them from being nothing ſubſtantial, and from being Infinite as God is. 2. We grant Spirits a quantitas diſcreta; they are numerous, individuate; and formae ſe multiplicant. Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter? But if he ſhould, that would be no deſtruction of their Species, as the mixtorum diſſolutio is; but as every drop of divided Water is Water, & one Candle lighting many, and many joyned in one, are all the ſame fire; ſo much more would it be with Spirits, were they united or divided; and their locality and penetrability are paſt our conceit. 3. But were we ſure of what we ſay therein; theſe two (Penetrability and Indiviſibility) ſpeak but Accidents, though proper; and therefore are no ſatisfying notice of the notion of Subſtance Spiritual as diſtinct from Matter. I am hitherto therefore conſtrained to contain many thoughts in the following compaſs.

1. I know Spirits beſt by the Virtus vitalis formalis una trina.

2. I hold that of Created Spirits ſubſtantia as notiſying a Baſis realis, muſt be the Conceptus Fundamentalis.

3. The word Immaterial ſignifying nothing (but a negation) and Materia being by many Antients uſed in the ſame ſenſe as we do Subſtantia, I uſually lay by the words.

4. I hold to the diſtinction of Natures, or Subſtances Paſſive and Active.

5. I diſtinguiſh Spiritual Subſtances as ſuch by the Purity of the Subſtance, beſides the Formal Difference.

6. Yet I doubt not but all Created Spirits are ſomewhat Paſſive, quia influxum cauſae primae recipiunt: And you grant them a Spiſſitude and Extenſion, which ſignifie as much as many mean that call them Material. But Cuſtom having made Materia, but ſpecially Corpus, to ſignifie onely ſuch groſſer Subſtance as the three Paſſive Elements have, I yield ſo to ſay, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.

7. Though I run not into the exceſs of Ludov. Le Grand de Igne (nor of Teleſius or Patricius) I would Ignis were better ſtudied: But this Room will not ſerve me to ſay what I think of it. But in brief, He that knoweth that Ignis is a Substance, whoſe Form is the Potentia Activa movendi, illuminandi, caleſaciendi, theſe as received in a groſs Paſſive Body, being but their Accidents oft, but the Igneous Subſtance in act operating on them, and conceiveth of Spirits, but as Ignis eminenter, that is, of a purer ſubſtance than Ignis is, which we beſt conceive of (next the Formal Virtue) by its ſimilitude, I think knows as much as I can reach of the Subſtance of Created Spirits. And the Greek Fathers that called Spirits Fire, and diſtinguiſhed Ignem per formas into Intellective, Senſitive, and Vegetative or Viſible Fire, (as it is in Aere Ignito,) allowing an Incomprehenſible [•]urity of Subſtance in the higher above the lower (as in Paſſives Air hath above Water, &c.) I think did ſpeak tolerably, and as informingly as are the notions of Penetrability and Indiviſibility; though perhaps th[•]ſe alſo may be uſeful.

Sir, I crave your pardon of theſe curt expreſſions of the thoughts which you deſired concerning the deſcription of a Spirit. If God make us truly holy, we ſhall quickly know more to our ſatisfaction. I reſt

Nov. 17. 1681.

Your obliged Servant, Rich. Baxter.

You make [a Spirit to be Ens, ideoque, Unum, Verum, and that True denotes the anſwerableneſs of the thing to its proper Idea, and implies right matter and form duly conjoined.] Q. Do you not here make Spirits material? But no doubt whether to be called Material or Subſtantial, the form is not an Adjoyned thing, but the form of a ſimple eſſence is but an inadequate conceptus, making no compoſition.

OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS:

A Placid Collation with the Learned Dr Henry More; upon his Anſwer to à private Letter, publiſhed in the ſecond Edition of Mr. Glanviles Sadduceiſmus Triumphatus.

Reverend Sir,

§ 1. THat my haſty Letter ſhould occaſion you to benefit the World with more of your Information, in ſo conſiderable a point, as is the nature of a Spirit, was more than I thought of, or could hope for: Had I imagined that you would have ſo far honoured it, I ſhould have ſo written it, as might have drawn out more of your Inſtruction, and made your Animadverſions yet more edifying.

§ 2. I deſired you to have forborn the title of Pſychopyriſt, for theſe Reaſons: 1. Becauſe it tendeth plainly to miſinform the Reader, as if I held that Souls (or Spirits) are Fire; whereas in my Books and Letters, I ſtill ſay otherwiſe. And that they may be ſo called not formaliter, or univoce, but only eminenter and analogice. And when a name on the Title page, & through the whole, and a ſuppoſition in much of your arguing, implyeth that I hold what I renounce, it may wrong your Reader's underſtanding, though I am below the capacity of being wronged.

2. And the faſtning of Nicknames on one another in Controverſies of Religion, hath ſo much cauſed Schiſms, and other miſchiefs, that I confeſs I the leſs like it about Philoſophy. But I muſt ſubmit.

§ 3. My underſtanding is grown ſo ſuſpicious of ambiguity in almoſt all words, that I muſt confeſs that what you ſay alſo againſt thoſe whom you call Holenmerians and Nullibiſts ſatisfieth me not, unleſs many terms uſed in the controverſies, were farther explained than I find them here, or in your Metaphyſicks (your Books againſt Judge Hale I have not ſeen.) But I may take it for granted that you know that they who uſe the ſaying of [Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte] ordinarily tell us; 1. That they uſe the word Tota relatively, and improperly; ſeeing that which hath no parts is improperly called Tota. 2. That they mean it but negatively, viz. That the Soul is not in the parts of the body, per partes, part in one part, and part in another, but indiviſibly. And one would think this ſhould ſuit with your own hypotheſis.

And when I better know in what ſenſe Locus is uſed, I ſhall be fitter to enquire whether Spirits be in loco. When ſome take it for a circumſcribing body, and ſome for a ſubjective body (on which it operateth) and ſome for a meer room poſſeſt in vacuo, and ſome for God himſelf in whom are all things, the name of a Nullibiſt is as ambiguous to me.

§ 4. You tell your Reader that [All created Spirits are Souls in all probability, and actuate ſome Matter or other.]

Sir, Philoſophers freedom is uſually taken eaſilyer than Divines; I will therefore preſume that our mutual freedom ſhall not be in the leaſt diſtaſtful to either of us: And ſo I muſt tell you that I have long taken it for a matter of very great uſe to diſtinguiſh unknown things from known, and to bridle my underſtanding from preſuming to enquire into unrevealed things: And I take that holdneſs of Philoſophers to have had a great hand in corrupting Divinity. Secret things are for God, and things revealed for us and our Children, ſaith Moſes. And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf, and miſuſe my underſtanding: nothing is good for that which it was not made for: Our underſtandings as our Eyes are made only for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this to be an exceſs; And I have oft wondred at your Friend, and (ſometime) mine, Mr. Glanvile, that after his Scepſis ſcientifica, he could talk▪ and write of doubtful things with that ſtrange degree of confidence, and cenſuring of Diſſenters as he did. I am accuſed of overdoing, and curioſity my ſelf: But I endeavour to confine my enquiries to things revealed.

This premiſed I ſay, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed, either as to any certainty or probability, that all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter. Alaſs how ſhould we come to know it. Neither Nature nor Scripture tells it us.

But 1. If this be ſo, the difference between you and the Pſychopyriſts muſt be opened as it is (much like that of Mammertus and Fauſtus,) whether the Soul (or a Spirit) have Matter by compoſition, or ſimply uncompounded: for a body you ſuppoſe it ſtill to have. Is it ſeparable from a Body or not? If it be, why ſhould you think that it is never ſeparated? If it can ſubſiſt without a Body, who can ſay that it doth not? If it cannot but be inſeparable, it is a ſtrange compoſition that God cannot diſſolve. And if it periſh upon the diſſolution, then it was but an Accident of the body, and not a compounding Subſtance. Dr. Gliſſons and Campanella's way is as probable as this; And I marvel that when you have dealt with ſo many ſorts of Deſſenters you meddle not with ſo ſubtile a piece as that old Doctor's de Vita Naturae: I have talkt with divers high pretenders to Philoſophy here of the new ſtrain, and askt them their judgment of Dr. Gliſſons Book, and I found that none of them underſtood it, but neglected it as too hard for them, and yet contemned it. He ſuppoſeth all Matter to be animated without compoſition, the Matter and Form being but conceptus inadequati, of an uncompounded being, however that Matter as ſuch be diviſible, into atomes, every atome ſtill being uncompounded living Matter. You ſuppoſe all Spirit to be in Matter. but by way of compoſition as diſtinct ſubſtances. I go the middle way, and ſuppoſe that ſubſtance (ſimple) is Active or Paſſive: that the three Paſſive Elements, Earth, Water and Air are animated only by compoſition, or operation of the active; But that the active ſubſtances have no compoſition, (but intellectual) but Subſtance and Form are conceptus ejuſdem inadequati. So that what Dr. Gliſſon ſaith of every clod and ſtone, I ſay only of Spirits, (of fire I ſhall ſpeak after.)

2. And do you think that the Soul carrieth a body out of the body inſeparable with it, or only that it receiveth a new body when it paſſeth out of the old. If the latter, is there any inſtant of time between the diſpoſſeſſion of the old, and the poſſeſſion of the new. If any, then the Soul is ſometime without a body: And how can you tell how long. If not what body is it that you can imagine ſo ready to receive it without any interpoſition? I have not been without temptations to over inquiſitive thoughts about theſe matters: And I never had ſo much ado to overcome any ſuch temptation, as that to the opinion of Averrhoes, that as extinguiſhed Candles go all into one illuminated air, ſo ſeparated Souls go all into one common Anima Mundi, and loſe their individuation, and that Materia receptiva individuat. And then indeed your notion would be probable; for the Anima mundi mundum ſemper animat, and ſo my ſeparated Soul ſhould be ſtill imbodyed in the world, and ſhould have its part in the worlds animation; But both Scripture and Apparitions aſſure us of the individuation of Spirits, and ſeparate Souls.

And I confeſs to you that I have oft told the Sadduces and Infidels, that urge ſeeming impoſſibilities againſt the Reſurrection, and the activity of ſeparate Souls for want of Organs, that they are not ſure that the Soul taketh not with it, at its departure hence, ſome ſeminal material Spirits (ethereal and airy;) and ſo that this ſpirituous or igneous body, which it carrieth hence, is a ſemen to the body, which it ſhall have at the Reſurrection, no man knoweth the contrary, and no man knoweth that it is ſo.

The Soul is many months here in organizing its own body in generation, and more in nouriſhing it to a uſeful ſtate: That particular organical bodies are made ready to receive them juſt at death, is hard to be believed: That the matter of the Vniverſe is ſtill ready is paſt doubt. But how organized, or how the Soul worketh without Organs, we ſhall better know hereafter. Your opinion much favoureth the Pythagoreans; If the Soul be never out of a body, is it not as like to come into one new forming in the womb, as into we know not what or where?

§ 5. I could wiſh you had printed my Letter wholly by it ſelf before you had annexed your anſwer, that the Reader might have underſtood it; which I can hardly do my ſelf as you have parcel'd it. But we muſt not have what we would have from wiſer men.

I take it for an odd method, when I never aſſerted Spirits to be fire, but denyed it, firſt to be in your Epiſtle feigned to have ſaid it, and yet in the end of it for you to ſay that [I mean not ordinary fire, but that my meaning is more ſubtile and refined] and never tell the Reader what it is before you diſpute it, and then through the whole anſwer to diſpute▪ on a wrong ſuppoſition, and in the end of the Book to confeſs again that I ſay not that Spirits are fire or material.

§ 6. Had I been to chooſe an edifying method, we would firſt have ſtated our queſtion, and agreed on the meaning of our terms; But I muſt follow your ſteps; though I had rather have done otherwiſe.

Ad SECT. I.

§ 1. THat my Notions are like thoſe of Judge Hale, is no wonder; we were no ſtrangers to each others thoughts about theſe matters; and though he and you have had ſome peaceable Velitations, I take it for no diſhonour to be of his mind.

1. De Nomine: There is no ſuch agreement among Philoſophers of the name Matter as you ſuppoſe. I refer you for brevity, but to a very ſmall Book of a very Learned Author (advanced by the Preface of one eminent for ſubtilty) the Metaphyſicks of Dr. Rich. Crakenthorp, who tells you at large, that Matter is taken either properly (as you and I do Subſtance) and ſo Spirits are material, or improperly and narrowly for that only which hath the three dimenſions; and ſo Spirits are not material. It's unprofitable to cite many more to to the ſame purpoſe: And I ſuppoſe you know, that not only Tertullian, but many other of the Fathers (many of whom you may find cited by Fauſtus Reg. whom Mammertus anſwereth) ſo uſed both Matter and Corpus alſo.

§ 2. The word [Form] is as ambiguous; You and I are not the only perſons that uſe it not in the ſame ſenſe. Matter in its firſt Conceptus called Primus, hath no Form; that is, is conceived of abſtracted from all Form. Matter in its next Conceptus is conceived of as diverſified by accidents, as quantity, figure, &c. And ſo the 3 paſſive Elements, Earth, Air & Water, are diverſified by many accidents, making up that Conſiſtence, which is called their ſeveral forms, known only by ſensſe, and capable of no perfect definition. Many ſuch paſſive Materials conjunct have their Relative Form, which is that Contexture in which conſiſteth their aptitude for their uſe: as a Houſe, a Ship, a Gun, a Watch. In Compoſitions where the Active natures are added, and operate unitedly on the paſſive, there the Active is the Form of the Compound, quite in another ſenſe than any of the former, viz. as it is principium motus.

You and I are enquiring of the different Forms of Matter and Spirit: You ſay that Impenetrability, and Diviſibility are the Form of Matter, and the contrary of Spirit: I ſay, that 1. Subſtance as Subſtance, (and Matter taken for Subſtance, which Dr. Crakenthorpe thinketh is the propereſt ſenſe) as ſuch hath no Form, that is, in conceptu primo. 2. That ſubſtance diſtinguiſhed by ſubtilty & craſſitude, viſibility and inviſibility, quantity, ſhape, motion, &c. doth herein differ Modally: And this Mode may well enough be called the Form, before it have another Form: And as the divers foreſaid Elements thus differ, ſo the ſubſtance of Spirits no doubt hath ſome Modal Excellency above all Bodies or Matter ſtrictly or narrowly ſo called: And if you will call this a Form, I contend not about the word, but it is but equivocally ſo called, Spirits having another nobler ſort of Form. 3. Nothing hath two Forms univocally ſo called: But Spirits have all that Virtus formalis, which I oft deſcribed▪ which is their very form: There is no Spirit without it: It's not a Compounding part, but the form of a ſimple ſubſtance. Vital Virtue, Vis, Potentia activa, ſignifieth not the ſame thing with Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility; Therefore both cannot be the Form univocally ſo called: And how you could put both theſe your ſelf into one definition, as a kind of Compounded Form I wonder. Yea, your two words themſelves ſignify not the ſame thing: Penetrable and Indiſcerpible are not words of one ſignification. And ſurely you will grant that theſe two, Penetrable and Indiſcerpible can be no otherwiſe a Form to Spirits, than Impenetrable and Diſcerpible are a Form to Matter. And it's apparent that the firſt is but a modal conceptus, and the latter a relative notion of Matter, and neither one nor both are contrary to Virtus Vitalis in a Spirit (or Virtus activa:) Meer paſſive potentiality is rather the contrary difference here.

And I know not why you might not as well have named divers other Accidents or Modes, eſpecially Quantity, and the trina dimenſio, and called them all the Form of Matter, as well as your two.

Indeed when we have from ſenſe a true notion of Matter, we muſt know that it hath Quantity, and is ſomewhere, and therefore that one part of it, and another part cannot poſſeſs juſt the ſame place; and ſo we grant you the Impenetrability: And how far you prove Spirits to be ſuch ſubſtances as are extended, and have Amplitude (as you ſay pag. 105.) and ſpiſſitude, and be in loco, and in more or leſs ſpace variouſly, and yet that they have no dimenſions which the Divine Intellect or Power itſelf can meaſure; and whether all the Spirits in the univerſe can be in eodem puncto, and all that are finite, contracted into that one point, I leave this to Wits more ſubtil than mine to judge of.

For to tell you the truth, I know nothing at all without the mediation of ſenſe, except the immediate ſenſation it ſelf, & the acts of Intellection & Volition or Nolition, & what the Intellect inferreth of the like, by the perception of theſe. I have ſeen & felt how Water differeth from Earth, and from that ſenſation my Intellect hath that Idea of the difference which it hath: But without that ſeeing and feeling it, all the definitions in the world, and all the names of hard and ſoft, and dry and moiſt, would have given me no true notice of the formal difference. Now hence I infer, that I have no ſenſe at all of the difference of a Spirits Subſtantiality in ſuch modes and accidents from that of Matter; and therefore how can I know it? I know by knowing what knowing is, and by willing what willing is: And I know that theſe Acts prove a power (for nothing doth that which it cannot do,) and that Act and Power prove a Substance, (for nothing hath nothing, and can do nothing:) ab eſt tertii▪ adjecti ad eſt ſecundi valet argumentum: And I know, that unleſs Light might be called Spirit, Spirits are to me inviſible: And ſo I can knowingly ſay, 1. What they do, 2. What they can do, 3. What they are in the genus of Subſtantiality, 4. And what they are not as to many Attributes proper to Viſible Subſtances or Bodies; 5. And I have elſewhere fully proved in a ſpecial Diſpute (in Methodo Theol.) that the Power of Vital Action, Intellection and Volition, is not a meer Accident of them, but their very eſſential form. But as to that Modification of their Subſtance which is contrary to Impenetrability and Diviſibility, I may grope, but I cannot know it poſitively, for want of ſenſation.

§ 2. Is an Atom Matter? or is it not? If one Atom be no matter, then two is none, and then there is none. If an Atom be matter, is it Diſcerpible or not? If not, how is this the Form of Matter? If it be diviſible, it is not an Atom; that's a contradiction. And if every Atom be diviſible in infinitum, it is as great, or greater than the world, and then there are as many Infinites as Atoms. That three Atoms united cannot be divided juſt in the middle, etiam per Divinam Potentiam, is becauſe it implieth a contradiction, viz. that an Atom is diviſible; ſo that by you an Atom is a Spirit.

Do you take the word [Penetrable] actively, or paſſively, or both? If actively according to you Matter is penetrable; for it can penetrate a Spirit, that is, poſſeſs the ſame place. But I perceive you mean that Spirits can penetrate Bodies, & alſo that they can penetrate one another.

And I ſuppoſe that by Penetration you mean not that which ſeparateth parts, of the Matter, & cometh in between theſe parts, but you mean poſſeſſing the ſame place, as is ſaid: And if ſo, do you put no limitation? or what? I ask before, can all the Created Spirits in Heaven and Earth be in the ſame Atom of matter? If ſo, are they then abſent from all other place? or is every Spirit ubiquitary? You confute the Nullibiſts by the operation of the Soul on the Body: Ibi operatur, ergo ibi eſt: And do you think that all the Angels in Heaven, and all Created Souls may be in one Body by Penetration? If ſo, Are they one Soul there, or innumerable in one man? And if they may be all in one point, and ſo be all one, may they not be divided again? I confeſs my ignorance of the Conſiſtence of ſpiritual Subſtance is ſo great, that I am not able to ſay, that God who hath given Souls quantitatem diſcretam, and made them innumerable, is not able to make one of two, or many, and to turn that one into two, or many again: I am not ſure that it is a contradiction; eſpecially if it be true that Sennertus, and many more ſay of the multiplication of Forms by Generation.

But if you take Penetrability paſſively, then you mean that Spirits may be penetrated by Bodies, or by one another, or both. No doubt you mean both, and ſo, as I ſaid, Bodies alſo are penetrable, both actively and paſſively; that is, Bodies can penetrate Spirits, and be penetrated by Spirits. Whether any Bodies penetrate each other, viz. whether Light or its vehicle at leaſt be a Body, and whether it penetrate the body of Glaſs or Chryſtal, with more about theſe matters, I have heretofore ſpoken in my Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion Append. Obj. 2. p. 525. and forward.

§ 3. To conclude this; as in natural mixt Bodies, there are three principles, Materia, Materiae Diſpoſitio (for that I think is a fitter expreſſion than Privatio) & Forma; ſo in ſimple Beings there are three (not parts, but) conceptus inadaequati anſwerable hereto; viz.

I. In the three paſſive Elements, Earth, Water and Air, there is in each, 1. The Matter, 2. The Diſpoſition of that matter by contexture, and various modes, of which Impenetrability and Diviſibility are parts; 3. The paſſive Form reſulting from all theſe, which conſiſteth in their various aptitude to their uſes; eſpecially their Receptivity of the Influx of the Active Natures. Here you put two Attributes together, which are both but parts of the Materiae Diſpoſitio, and call them two the Form.

II. In the Active Natures, there is, 1. The Subſtantiality, 2. The Subſtantiae Diſpoſitio, 3. The Form.

Of the firſt (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Subſtantiality, we agree, of the ſecond Conceptus we differ: That ſuch Subſtances have an incomprehenſible Purity, of which we can have no diſtinct Idea for want of Senſation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Subſtantiae Diſpoſitio, is that which I ſay: And you ſay that Penetrability and Indiviſibility are the Form, which (at moſt) are but the Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae; and yet you joyn the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too, which is quite of another conception. And ſo we differ of the third Conceptus, viz. the Form alſo; which I affirm of all ſimple active natures to be the Virtus Activa: And if they are Vital, the Virtus Vitalis.

Of the name Vita, there is a Controverſie, which muſt be diſtinguiſhed from that de re. If it be true that Dr. Gliſſon ſaith, that every Atom of matter hath in it a Motive Principle without Compoſition, then the Motive Virtue is the Form of all Matter as well as of Spirit. If all be to be called Living or Spirit, which hath a Virtus Motiva for its Eſſential Form, then Ignis (or Aether) is Vital and Spirit; for it hath an Eſſential Motive Principle as its Form. Therefore the Queſtion whether Ignis or Aether) be Life or Spirit, is but a queſtion de nomine (ſuch as too many uſually in Diſputes manage, as if it were de re.) It is no Life or Spirit, if by thoſe names you mean only Senſitive and Intellectual Natures: But it is Life and Spirit, if by that name you mean only an Eſſential Formal Motive Principle.

I have oft profeſſed that I am ignorant whether Ignis and Vegetative Spirit be all one (to which I moſt incline) or whether Ignis be an Active Nature, made to be the Inſtrument by which the three Spiritual Natures, Vegetative, Senſitive and Mental work on the three Paſſive Natures: And though I was wont to think, that what I knew not my ſelf, all men of great Learning knew, ſpecially ſuch as you, in the points which you have with ſingular induſtry ſtudied; yet now experience hath baniſhed that modeſt Errour, and convinced me that other men muſt be content with an humble Ignoramus as well as I.

§ 4. And here I muſt note, that § 18. p. 127. where you purpoſely define a Spirit, you agree with me: Your definition is [A Spirit is an Immaterial Subſtance intrinſecally endued with Life, and the Faculty of Motion.] Forgive me for thinking that you are not ſtrict enough in your terms for a definition; but plainly you ſeem to mean the ſame as I do. You ſhould, I think, have mentioned a Spirit as a ſimple Subſtance differing from a mixt; and have ſaid, not only [intrinſecally] endued, for ſo is every Animal who is Body as well as Spirit, but alſo endued with it as its ſimple Formal Eſſence: And whether all Faculty of Motion (e. g. Gravitation) be Life, I am in doubt. But here 1. You agree with me in the firſt Conceptus [Subſtance;] And 2. As to that mode of Subſtance which I call the Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae ad Formam, you call it but [Immaterial] which is a negative, and ſpeaketh nothing poſitively; which is ſuch an honeſt Confeſſion as we poor Ignorants apertly make, that what the excellent Purity or modal Conſiſtence of Spiritual Subſtance is as compared to Material (or Corporeal) becauſe we never ſaw or felt it as we do Corporeal; we do not formally know, and therefore only tell men de genere, that it is moſt pure and excellent; but in ſpecial, that we have no true Idea of it, and therefore only tell men what it is not [not material] and not what it is. 3. But you name no Formal Difference but Life: When you add [the Faculty of Motion] it is a defective Explication of the Virtus Vitalis, which is ever Vnica-triplex, viz. Activa-Pe[•]ceptiva-Appetitiva, when it operateth to generation or augmentation. And do you think that Life and Immateriality are Synonyma's? Or that Life and Penetrable and Indiſcerpible, are Synonyma's? Or that the Form of a Spirit is a Compound of ſuch and ſo many Heterogeneals? Had you held to this definition, I think you had done beſt.

§ 5. Pag. 129. You ſeem to explain Immaterial ſo as to make Indiſcerpibility an immediate Attribute, and expound it, It is indiſcerpible into real Phyſical parts: (ſo is an Atom.) But as Phyſical ſignifieth corporeal, ſome will ſay, it may yet be per potentiam divinam divided into Spiritual parts. And you expound Penetrability actively, that it can penetrate the matter and things of its own kind, that is, paſs through Spiritual Subſtances: And ſuch any groſs Body can paſs through.

§ 6. When Anſw. p. 3. you ſay of a Spirit, that it is [ſo ſubtil as to be in ſuch ſort penetrable.] And in Sect. 31. to which you refer us, you make the difference of Spirit penetrating, and Body impenetrable to be ſubtilty and craſſitude.] Could any of us have ſaid more whom you contradict? Is Subtilty and Craſſitude the difference between Spiritual Subſtance and Material in their Conſiſtency? I have not ſaid ſo much as this.

§ 7. As to your oft-mentioned per ſe & non per aliud, as proper to Spirits, I am paſt doubt, that Spirits more depend on God for Being and Motion, than Matter doth on Spirits (Created.) But it's difference enough that God giveth them an Eſſential Formal Virtue ſelf-moving receptive of his moving Influx, when Paſſives move only as moved by ſelfmovers: (unleſs the aggregative Motion muſt be excepted, of which afterward.)

Ad SECT. II.

§ 1. THree Faults, of which one is a Miſchief, you find with my Conceptus formalis. 1. That it leaveth out what is contained in the Conceptus formalis of a Spirit in General, Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility.

Anſ. 1. It is but the diſpoſitio Subſtantiae at moſt, and not a proper Conceptus formalis. 2. You leave out other modifications as eſſential. 3. It leaveth none out that is known, while I ſay that it is Substantia puriſſima, which containeth your Modes and Attributes with more if they be true, if not, it avoideth the errours.

§ 2. 2. You ſay, [It puts in Perception, and we have no aſſurance that a plaſtick Spirit hath Perception, but as ſuch hath none: Elſe the Soul would perceive the Organization of its own Body.

Anſ. Dr. Gliſſon, de Vita Naturae and Campanella, have ſaid ſo much againſt you of this, that ſuppoſing the Reader to have peruſed them, I will not repeat it.

Did you think that there is no Perception but ſenſitive or Intellectual? Such indeed the vegetative Spirit hath not; but it hath a vegetative Perception. A Plant groweth in a Soil of various qualities: It attracteth to itſelf that part of Nutriment which is congruous to it, and digeſteth that ſo Attracted: And therefore it hath an anſwerable Perception, which ſort is congruous to it, and which not, when it neglecteth one ſort, and draweth another. It doth not ſee or feel it, nor underſtand it, but inſenſibly perceiveth it.

3. You ſay, you [do not eaſily aſſent to that conceit of a Trinity in this Conceptus formalis which I make to conſiſt in Virtute una-trina, vitali, perceptiva, appetitiva.]

Anſ. Nor did I eaſily aſſent to it; nor did Dr. Gliſſon after 80 Years of age, eaſily procure men to aſſent to it, nor Campanella take ſo marvellouſly with others as he did with our Commenius and ſome ſuch. And far be it from me to expect you ſhould eaſily aſſent to it, when I come not to you as a Teacher. But whereas you ſay, that theſe make three no more than Animal, Homo, and Brutum, or Cupiditas, Deſiderium, and Fuga, you ſilence me; for it beſeemeth me not to ſpeak to you in a Teaching Language, and there is no other to convince you. And if all that I have ſaid in Method. Theol. will not do it, I confeſs it will not eaſily be done, Animal, Homo, and Brutum, are three words containing only a Generical, and ſpecifick nature in two diſtinct ſpecies of Subjects: If you think that in the Sun Virtus-motiva, illuminativa, & calefactiva, or in mans Soul a vegetative, ſenſitive, and Intellective power, or in the latter, mentally-active, Intellective, and Volitive Virtue, are no other, I will not perſuade you to change your mind, much leſs give you any Anſwer to your ſimile of cupiditas, deſiderium, fuga, ſave that you might almoſt as well have named any three Words.

§ 3. But you ſay [The Omiſſion of Immaterial in your Conceptus formalis, or which is all one of Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility is not only a miſtake but a miſchief; it implying that the Virtus Appetitiva & perceptiva may be in a Subſtance though material, which betrays much of the ſuccours which Philoſophy affords to Religion, &c.

Anſ. Melancholy may cauſe fears by ſeeming Apparitions. I hope no body will be damned for uſing or not uſing the Word Material or Immaterial: It's eaſie to uſe either to prevent ſuch danger. And I am not willing again to examine the ſenſe of theſe words every time you uſe them. You know I ſaid not that Spirits are Material: And you ſay they are Subſtances of Extenſion, Amplitude, Spiſſitude, Locality, and Subtilty, as oppoſite to Craſſitude. And what if another think juſt ſo of them, (or not ſo groſly) and yet call them Matter, will the word undoe him? But you ſay I omitt Immaterial. Anſ. See my Append. to Reaſ. of Chriſt. Rel. whether I omit it: But is a bare Negative Eſſential to a juſt definition here? Why then not many Negatives more, (as inviſible, inſenſible, &c.) To ſay that Air is not Water, or Water is not Earth, was never taken for defining, nor any miſchief to omit it.

But that the poſitive term Puriſſima doth not include Immaterial, and is not as good, you have not as yet proved. Is Subſtantia puriſſima material? Do not you by that intimation do more to aſſert the Materiality of Spirits than ever I did? Have you read what I have anſwered to 20 Objections of the Somatiſts in the aforeſaid Append.

But you ſay, It implyeth that Virtus perceptiva, &c. may be in a ſubſtance material. Anſ. Negatur. If I leave out 20 Negatives in my Definition, it followeth not that the form may be with their poſitives. But can you excuſe your ſelf from what you call a Miſchief, when you intimate that Subſtantia puriſſima may be material? Becauſe I only called it puriſſima, you ſay I imply it may be material.

But I confeſs I am too dull to be ſure that God cannot endue matter itſelf with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you ſay the Carteſians hold the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me not. O the marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as Campanella, Dr. Gliſſon, &c. were confident that no Matter in the world was without the una-trina Virtus, viz. Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive; I agree not with them: But you on the contrary ſay, that Materia qualitercunque modificata is uncapable of Perception. I doubt not, materia qua materia, or yet qua mere modificata hath no LIfe: But that it is uncapable of it; and that Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impoſſible? Nor do I believe that it giveth a man any more cauſe to doubt (as you add) of the Exiſtence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul, than your Opinion that ſaith, God cannot do this.

To paſs by many other I will but recite the words of Micraelius Ethnophron, li. 1. c. 13. p. 23, 24. inſtancing in many that held the Soul to be Pure Matter. [Eam Sententiam inter veteres, probavit apud Macrobium, Heraclitus Phyſicus, cui anima eſt Eſſentiae Stellaris ſcintilla; Et Hipparchus apud Plinium, cui eſt coeli pars: Et Africanus apud Ciceronem qui detrahit animum ex illis ſempiternis ignibus quae Sidera vocamus; quaeque globoſae & rotundae divinis animatae mentibus circules ſuos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili: Et Seneca qui deſcendiſſe eam ex illo coeleſti Spiritu ait; Et Plato ipſe qui alicubi animam vocat [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉], radians & ſplendidum vehiculum: Et Epictetus qui Aſtra vocat nobis [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉], amica & cognata elementa: Ipſeque cum Peripateticis Ariſtoteles qui eam quinta eſſentia conſtare, & [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] in animabus ineſſe dicit: Inter noſtrates quoque Scaliger vocat animam Naturam coeleſtem & quintam eſſentiam, alia quidem à quatuor Elementis naturâ praeditam, ſed non ſine omni materia: Eadem Opinio arridet Roherto de Fluctibus, &c. And what many Fathers ſay I have elſewhere ſhewed.

And yet on condition you will not make the name Subſtance to ſignifie no real Being, but a meer Relation, or Quality, I think you and I ſhall ſcarce differ in ſenſe.

§ 4. But you magnifie our difference, ſaying [In this you and I fundamentally differ, in that you omit, but I include, Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility in the Conceptus formalis of a Spirit. Anſ. I think you mean better than you ſpeak, and err not fundamentally. 1. I do not think that your two hard words are fundamentals, nor that one or both are Synonyma to Immaterial. 2. I do not think but Puriſſima includeth all that is true in them, and ſo leaveth them not out. 3. I do not leave them out of the Diſpoſitio vel modus Subſtantiae, though I leave them out of the Conceptus formalis. 4. Your ſelf affirm the vital Virtue to be the Conceptus formalis. And hath a Spirit more forms than one! You know of no exiſtent Spirit in the World that hath not its proper ſpecifick form: And if your two words had been a Generical Form, that's no form to the ſpecies, but a Subſtantiae diſpoſitio. Doth he fundamentally err that ſaith Corpus humanum organicum is not forma hominis? Or that the puritas vel ſubtilitas materiae is not forma [•]gnis vel ſolis, but only the materiae diſpoſitio? If our little ſelf made words were ſo dangerous on either ſide, I ſhould fear more hurt by making the form of a Spirit 1. To be but the Conſiſtence or mode of the Subſtance, 2. And that to conſiſt in divers accidents conjunct, 3. And thoſe uncertain in part, or unintelligible, 4. And Spirits to have two Forms, or one made up of divers things, 5. And to place the form in a Negation of Matter. What a jumble is here, when the true definition of a Spirit is obvious?

§ 5. You ſay, [Penetrability maketh it pliant and ſubtil, and to a Subſtance of ſuch Oneneſs and Subtility is rationally attributed, whatever Activity, Sympathy, Synenergy, Appetite and Perception is found in the world.

Anſ. There is Oneneſs in Matter (in Atoms at leaſt) and doth Penetrability make Subtilty? And is Subtilty the difference? ſure, if you make any ſenſe of this, it muſt favour the conceit of Materiality more than my term Puriſſima.

But do you verily believe that Penetrability or Subtilty is a ſufficient, efficient, or Formal Cauſe of Vitality, Perception, Appetite? and ſo of Intellection and Volition? I hope you do not: It is the Eſſential Virtus Formalis (including Potentiam activam, Vim & Inclinationem) which muſt immediately cauſe the Acts; Subtilty and Penetrability elſe will not do it: No man will grant you that the Propoſition is good, ex vi Cauſalitatis, [Quodcunque penetrabile vel ſubtile eſt, ideo neceſſario vivit, percipit, appetit] unleſs it proceed à neceſſitate concomitantiae & exiſtentiae. Yet where you are moſt out of the way, you are at it again, that This Miſtake is a miſchief.

Ad SECT. III. & IV.

§ 1. YOur Third Section I am not concerned in: I tell you ſtill I deny not your Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility, though I lay not the ſtreſs on them as to Certainty or Importance, as you do, and am paſt doubt that they do but defectively ſpeak the Subſtantiality ſub conceptu modali & diſpoſitivo, and are unskilfully called the Forma Spiritus.

§ 2. Your 4th Section I had rather not have ſeen. 1. You diſlike that I ſay, that [a ſelf-moving Principle I dare not ſay is proper to a Spirit.] I hope Ignorance is never the worſe for being confeſt: All are not ſo wiſe as you. I deny it not; but I am not certain that Stones, Earth, and other heavy things, move not to the Earth by a ſelf-moving Principle. I am not ſure that if a Stone in the Air fall down, it is by a Spirits motion, and that God hath not made Gravitation, and other aggravative motion of Paſſives, to be an Eſſential ſelf-moving Principle. Few men I think have thought otherwiſe. And yet I am not ſure that all Stones and Clods are alive. If you are, bear with our Ignorance; for that is no Errour.

§ 3. When I ſay [I conſent not to Campanella de ſenſu rerum, or Dr. Gliſſon, that would make all things alive by an Eſſentiating Form in the very Elements.] Here you talk of foul play, to make one part fiſh, and the other fleſh; one part of Matter ſelf-moved, and other not.]

Anſ. But, worthy Sir, the foul play is yours, that ſeem to tell your Reader that I do ſo, which I never do: That is ſcant fair play. I ſaid not that Spirits are Matter, and I do but ſay I am ignorant whether Gravitation be from the Motion of a Spirit thruſting down the Stone, &c. or from an Eſſential Principle in the Matter. May not one be ignorant where he cannot chuſe? I cannot but much difference the motus aggregativus, ſuch as Gravitation cauſeth, which is only the tendency of the parts to the whole, that they may there reſt from motion, from the natural motion of known Life, which abhorreth ceſſation: I take Motus to be no Entity, but a mode of Subſtance; to be in motion or quieſcence, are ſeveral modes of it; and that mode which is moſt ſtated, moſt ſheweth nature. I ſee no contradiction in it, that a Stone ſhould fall without Life: I dare not ſay, that God cannot make a Rock or Clod to fall by an intrinſick Principle of Gravitation, without vital motion. And yet I am moſt inclined to your Opinion: But the ſtream of Diſſenters obligeth ſuch a one as I am to more modeſty than muſt be expected from one of your degree.

§ 4. Next you complain of [horrible Confuſion.] What's the matter? why, to include Life in the Conceptus Formalis of a Spirit (of which Self-motion is certainly an Effect) and yet ſay It is not proper to a Spirit. Anſ. It's worſe than confuſion to intimate that I ſaid what I did not. Your ſaying [It's certain] is no conviction of me, that there is no Self-motion but by Life. You think not that Fire liveth; and I am not ſure that a Stone is a ſelf-mover: I only ſay, I know not. I never yet ſaw your proof, that God is able to make no ſelf-mover but vital! And if he can, how know I that he doth not? The World ſuffers ſo much by mens taking on them to know more than they do, that I fear it in my ſelf, as one of the worſt Diſeaſes of Mankind.

§ 5. You conclude [We are to deny Self-motion in the matter it ſelf every where as not belonging thereto, but to Spirit]

Anſ. No doubt but Materia qua talis eſt mere paſſiva: But that God can put no motive inclination in it, or that he cannot give a Spiritual Vitality to any matter, are concluſions fitter for you than for me.

§ 6. To ſhew why I oft neglect the name [Material] (ſome taking it for the ſame with Subſtance, and ſome only for Corporeit) I ſaid, that the diſtinction of Natures into Active and Paſſive, ſerveth as well.] To this you ſay [Materiality is a Notion more ſtrict, diſtinct and ſteady.] Anſ. The contrary is commonly known, and before and elſewhere proved; when Materia is not only a very hard ambiguous word (and you have not yet enabled me by all your words, to know what you mean by it) but even ſuch great men as before named make the more general ſenſe (equal to Subſtance) to be the more proper: Had all uſed it, as you do, and you made us underſtand what you mean by it, I would hold to it accordingly.

You ſay, Paſſivity belongs to things Immaterial. Anſ. 1. Paſſivity as excluſive of Activity, or as predominant, doth not. 2. No Paſſivity belongeth to that which is not Matter in the foreſaid large ſenſe of Matter, of which more anon.

Ad SECT. V, VI.

§ 1. I Confeſt my Ignorance of the Cauſe of the deſcenſus gravium; whether it be from a Principle made by God eſſential to the matter that deſcendeth, or from an intrinſick compounding Active nature, or only from an extrinſick Mover. You here bid me not deſpair, for it is demonſtrable that the deſcenſus gravium is not from any principle ſpringing from their own Matter, but from an Immaterial principle diſtinct therefrom.

Anſ. 1. All doth not demonſtrate to me, which ſome call demonſtration; I perceive you note not at all what is my doubt, and how can you then ſolve it? I do not think that the Gravitation is from a principle ſpringing from the Matter. How can a Principle of Motion ſpring from Matter? But the doubt is of the ſeveral waies forenamed: 1. Whether it be from a principle in the Matter, as Dr. Gliſſon thought, as a Conceptus inadaequatus of its Eſſence, or at leaſt an inſeparable Quality or Accident. 2. Or whether it be by an Eſſential Compounding Principle, as Anima in homine: 3. Or by an extrinſick Agent only; Did you think that you had anſwered theſe?

You ſay, [which Principle to be the Mover of the Matter of the Vniverſe, I have over and over again demonſtrated in Ench. Metaph.]

Anſ. I would have had it plainer, but muſt take it as it is. It ſeems then that you think that it is only the Anima Mundi, without any ſubordinate moving Principle: But you ſhould have ſpoken out. I will not wrong you ſo much as to ſuppoſe that you think any Indiſcerpible Spirit proper to a Stone, or a Fox, or an Aſs, moveth all the World: Therefore I muſt judge that to the Motion of all the Stones, Clods, &c. in the world, there is none but an Univerſal Mover. I confeſs I think (as Dr. Gilbert de Magn.) and many others, that the whole Tellus hath one Active Principle (which I plainly think is Fire;) and if he call it Anima Telluris, I leave him to his liberty. But I think there are ſubordinate particular Moving Principles beſides the Univerſal?

Do you think that only the Anima Mundi animateth all Animals? I think you do not; elſe all Apparitions ſhould be but by one Soul. Beſides an Anima Vniverſalis, there muſt be a particular (or ſingular) Soul in every Man, Beaſt, Bird, &c. There muſt be more than the Univerſal Soul, to make you write, ſpeak, do better than others: And if ſo, how am I ſure that nothing under the Univerſal Spirit moveth deſcendentia gravia? In motu projectorum (another inſtance of my Ignorance) there is ſure ſome cauſality in Anima ſingulari projicientis. The Univerſal Cauſe is ever one, but excludeth not ſubordinate Moving Cauſes. My old Friend Mr. Sam. Got (on Moſis Philoſ.) ſuppoſeth each Element to have its ſpecial Spirit: I am not ſo well skilled in ſuch things, as to come to that certainty which others pretend to: I think to an equal common Motion an Univerſal Cauſe may ſuffice; but when Motions differ, I know not the different Cauſes ſo well as ſome think they do. How you anſwered Judge Hale of the Rundle in the Water, I know not: But you that think Fire in the Sun to be no Spirit but Matter, I am confident will never make me believe, that Fire and Sun are moved only by the Univerſal Mover, without any motive principle in themſelves. Your Metaphyſ. c. 13. I have peruſed, and am paſt doubt of a Spiritual Moving Power: But two things I ſee not proved; 1. That there are not particular Moving Principles ſubordinate to the more Univerſal. 2. That the God of Nature hath not put into the paſſive Elements, a ſtrong inclination of the parts to union with the whole, and to aggregative Motion when forcibly ſeparated; which Inclination Dr. Gliſſon calleth their Eſſential Life; but I think is ſomewhat that deſerveth not that name. I have not read your Vol. Philoſ. nor Adnot am. nor Anſwer to Judge Hale.

§ 2. Sect. 6. You ſay, This is to joyn the property of a Spirit to Matter. Anſw. That's it that I doubt of, whether all Self-motion (under the Univerſal Mover) be proper to a Spirit, or only Vital Self-motion.

§ 3. Your Aſſurance of the Earth's Motion, aſſureth not me: I have ſeen a M. S. of your Antagoniſt's Judge Hale, that inclineth me to deny it; and nothing more than the Igneous nature of the Sun, to which Motion is natural, and the torpid nature of Earth; God making every thing fit for its uſe. But of this, as my judgment is of little value, ſo I profeſs Ignorance.

§ 4. That there is Activity in fixed Thoughts, I grant; for Thinking is Acting. But that there is as much Activity in the not-acting of a Rock, e.g. I deny.

§ 5. Again, you are at the Miſchief of Leaving out your Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility, and Immateriality; to which I have oft anſwered. And I now add, you make it an abſurdity to name that as a Form, which is not proper to the thing: But Immateriality, Penetrability, or Indiſcerpibility in your own Judgment (I think) are none of them proper to Spirit. For they are common to divers Accidents in your account, viz. Light, Heat, Cold, &c. are all theſe.

Ad SECT. VII, VIII.

§ 1. YOU come to the main thing which I importuned you to bleſs the world with your explication of, viz. The true difference of Subſtance and Matter. And you ſay, It's obvious to any obſerving Eye. They differ as Genus and Species. Anſ. I would I had an obſerving Eye. If by Matter you mean ſenſible Matter, ſuch as Man can ſee, feel, or meaſure, &c. the difference indeed is obvious: My doubt is here; ſeeing you confeſs that ſubſtare accidentibus is but a relative notion; (and it's commonly ſaid that God hath no Accidents, and yet is a Subſtance: How true I ſay not,) and all your notice of it, beſides Negatives is, that [Subſtance is a Being ſubſiſting by it ſelf] and call this [a compleat Definition;] 1. How you can call that a compleat Definition of that which indeed is not definable, for want of a Genus: For you ſay Metaph. c. 2. that Ens quatenus Ens non poſſe eſſe objectum Metaphyſicae cum tam generale ſit ut & Ordine & Naturae & Doctrinae res Phyſicas antecedat, &c. But this I ſtick not at: Things not definable may be partly known. But 2. whereas it's granted by you, that Subſtantia and Vita (or Virtus Activa) are two inadequate Conceptus of a Spirit, do you hold that the Conceptus of Subſtantiality hath any more in it of Real Entity, than the bare Conceptus of Virtus Activa (or Vitalis) alone? Or whether the meaning be, that as it is Res the Virtus Activa is its total Conceptus, and Subſtantia is but added to ſignifie that Res illa quae dicitur Vita vel Virtus Vitalis ſubſiſtit per ſe, & non in alio, id eſt, non eſt Accidens. If this be the meaning that the word Vis, or Virtus, ſpeak all that is Res, and Subſtance ſpeak only its ſtate, as being no Accident, but a Self-Being; this is intelligible, and it agreeth with ſome mens thoughts of God himſelf. But this ſeemeth neither to be true (at leaſt of Creatures) nor to be your ſenſe. Not true; for a Created Virtus (vel Vita) quae non eſt alicujus Subſtantiae Virtus, vel ut Forma vel ut Accidens, ſeemeth above our reach to conceive. Though I know many call God Purus Actus, & the Schools moſtly agree that Subſtantia is not univocally ſpoken of God and us, and deny it to be properly ſaid of God; and I can eaſily grant that God is utterly above all formal knowledge of ours; yet that Created Spirits ſhould be a meer Virtus (or Potentia Activa, or Actus) ſeemeth hard to believe.

And many words intimate that it is not your Judgment, but that Subſtantiality ſignifieth not only the Modus of the Exiſtence of the Actus Entitativus, or Virtus, but is the firſt half and fundamental Conceptus of a Spirit as Res, ſpeaking halfly its Entity. In this I think we agree.

And now if this be ſo, this very Conceptus of Fundamental Reality, is but that ſame which Schibler, and abundance others call Materia Metaphyſica, as different from Materia Phyſica; and which Dr. Crakenthorpe, & many others, take the general and moſt proper ſenſe of Materia to contain. & therefore I ſay but, that you ſhould not take an equivocal word for univocal, and lay ſo great a ſtreſs on an ambiguous name. And I confeſs ſtill all your names of Indiſcerpibility, Penetrability and Immateriality, give me no ſcientifical notion of the true difference between the loweſt Subſtantiality of a Spirit, and the higheſt of Fire or Aether, or Ariſtotelis quinta Eſſentia (which you call Matter.) But I am fully ſatisfied of an Incomprehenſible Purity of Subſtance; 2. And of the true Form of a Soul; and I find my ſelf to need no more.

§ 2. The Thomiſts take the Faculties of the Soul to be but Accidents (as Mr. Pemble de Orig. Formar. doth the Souls of Brutes to be but Qualities of Matter) which I have elſewhere confuted: And theſe muſt needs think that the Notion of [〈◊〉] is almoſt all of the Soul.

§ 3. You add out of your Ethicks, nulliu[••] [〈◊〉] in[••]mam nudamque eſſentiam cognoſci poſſe, ſed Attributa tantum eſſentialia, eſſentialesque habitudines. We are not any way able to diſcover the very bare Eſſence or Subſtance of any thing.] Anſ. Yet you ſay before, [What can be more plain?] and [It's obvious to every obſerving Eye.] I conteſs I underſtand you not: I know no eſſentia that is not intima: And if by nudam you mean accidentibus nudatam, we know no Subſtance ſo, becauſe there is none ſuch created: but we can abſtract the Eſſence from the Accidents. And if we know not the nudam eſſentiam of any accident we know nothing. Eſſential Attributes, and Habitudes are hard words: If by the Attributes you mean the names or ſecond ſignal notions, we know the Eſſence of Letters, Names, Sentences; but by them ut per ſigna we know the things themſelves, but ſcientia abſtractiva non intuitivâ. But this is true knowledge of the Eſſence ſignified. If by the Attributes you mean any Accidents ſignified by thoſe Names, thoſe are not eſſential Attributes. But if you mean the Eſſence ſignified you ſay and unſay. I am paſt doubt that we know the Eſſences of the immediate Objects of Senſe, and alſo of our own Intellectual Acts. But how? There is ſcientia adaequata and inadaequata: I am paſt doubt that nihil ſcitur ſcientiâ adaequatâ, (but only inadaequata: And ſo ſtricte, Res ipſa non ſcitur quia tot a ejus Eſſentia non ſcitur; but aliquid rerum ſcitur; and this is true of the Eſſence itſelf. All our knowledge is partial and imperfect, a half Science, but it reacheth Eſſences.

Ad SECT. VIII.

§ 1. WHereas I think that only Vſage muſt expound the difference between the ſenſe of Subſtance and Matter, you deny it not, but ſtill miſſuppoſe that uſe taketh Matter but in one ſenſe, and never applieth it to ſpiritual Subſtance. All this de nomine is to little purpoſe, but I will recite ſome words of your own: Ench. Metaph. c. 2. p. 8, 9, 10. Eſſentia quae nihil aliud eſt quam materia & forma ſimul ſumptae—Duo principia illa Entis interna & incomplexa quatenus ens eſt, eſſe Materiam & formam Logicam—Et uniuscujuſque rei quatenus ens eſt Eſſentia conſiſtit ex Amplitudine & Differentia quae amplitudinem ab amplitudine diſcriminat. Nam quod res quaelibet aliquatenus Ampla ſit, ex eo patet, tum quod id voci materiae valde conſonum ſit quae tanquam principium Entis quatenus Ens eſt conſideratur; tum etiam quod nullam aliam ideam menti noſtrae ea afferre poteſt praeter hanc amplitudinem; Nec revera quicquam ab animis noſtris concipi omni amplitudine deſtitutum—p. 10. Ex quibus omnibus tandem profluit praeclarum hoc conſectarium quod omne Ens quatenus Ens eſt—Quantum, Quale—Ens dicitut reſpectu formae, legitimaeque conditionis materiae.—Quod omne Ens ſit Quantum, ex illius Materiâ intelligitur—Then you blame them qui imaginantur quaedam Entia omni Materia carentia, etiam hac Logica, omnique ad materiam relatione.—p. 12. Omnis ſubſtantia ex eo quod Ens ſit, Materiam quandam vel Amplitudinem in ſe includat.

You ſee here how much more now you write againſt your ſelf than me: I never ſaid that Spirits are material, nor that every Subſtance hath ſome matter, as you do.

§ 2. But this is but Materia Logica. Anſ. And thoſe that I excuſe do but call it Materia metaphyſica: And what's the meaning of Materia Logica? If Logick or Grammar uſe ſecond Notions, Names, and Signs, if they be not rebus aptata they are falſe. What is it now but the aptitude of the Name that we ſpeak of?

Yea, you that make Spatium to be God, calling it Locus internus, really diſtinct from Bodies, yet ſay that you prove by Apodectical Arguments, that it is tribus dimenſionibus praeditum: And no doubt God is a Spirit, ſo that you your ſelf make a Spirit, even the Father of Spirits, to be Matter that hath Amplitude, Quantity, and the three dimenſions; And yet write a Book againſt one as aſſerting Spirits to be matter, who never aſſerted it, unleſs the word Matter ſignifie but Subſtance: For I aſcribe no more to it than your Amplitude, if ſo much. And yet I take the word Amplitude to ſignifie no form at all, no more than Quantity or Dimenſions, or Indiviſibility, or Penetrability, but to be the Conſiſtent Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae▪

And you once hit on that true notion of the Conditio materiae as a neceſſary Conceptus Entis praeter ipſam materiam & formam, Metaphyſ. c. 2. p. 10. [Verum Ens dicitur reſpectu formae, Legitimaeque Conditionis materiae: Neque enim Galea ex tenui Papyro fabricata & concinnata vera galea eſt, ſed potius ludicrum illius imitamentum. And ſo elſewhere. Yet now you make the [〈…〉] to be the Form.

[〈…〉] you make all Spirits to [〈…〉] ſome matter, You [〈…〉] to be but Anima Mund[••] [〈…〉] it either as a [〈…〉] Subſtance, as we ſay [〈…〉] the Body, or elſe as the forma [〈…〉] which is but Conceptus inadaequatu[•]. [〈◊〉] Vitality is forma animae. If in the firſt [〈◊〉], you that ſay that operation of the Soul proveth locality, and aſcribe Amplitude and Quantity to God, and the three dimenſions, do ſeem to make him Intellectually though not actually Diviſible: That is, the Intellect may conceive of God as partly in the Sun, and partly on Earth, &c. or elſe you muſt ask pardon of your oppoſed Holenmerians as you name them, and ſay as they, that God is totus in toto & totus in qualibet parte.

If in the 2d ſenſe, then you make the matter only to be Subſtance, and God to be but the Form of that Subſtance (or as ſome dreams a Quality.) And then I confeſs your Notions of Indiſcerpible and Penetrable are very eaſily intelligible, as agreeing to the meer Form, (Vitality, Active-power, Wiſdom, and Love.)

But how either of theſe notions will ſtand, either with Gods Exiſtence ut ſpatium infinitum, beyond all Matter, (which you ſometime hint) or the Infiniteneſs of Matter, but with intermixt Vacuities, which (pag. 44. Metaph.) you ſeem to ſuppoſe to be communi naturae voce confirmatum) I know not: For then the vacuum is Deus extra materiam, and ſo all Spirit is not in matter. I think that all matter and Spirit is in God; and that he is much more than Anima Mundi & omnium animarum.

Ad SECT. IX.

§ 1. TO your Indiſcerpibility I further ſay, I diſtinguiſh, 1. Between Actual and Intellectual dividing; 2. Between what God can do, and what a Creature can do, and 3. Between the Father of Spirits and created Spirits: And ſo I ſay, 1. That if you had ſpoken of the meer Virtus Vitalis of a Spirit, I think it is a contradiction to ſay that it is Diſcerpible or impenetrable; But ſeeing you aſcribe Amplitude, Quantity, and Dimenſions, and Logical Materiality to the Subſtantiality of Spirits, I ſee not but that you make them Intellectually diviſible; that is, that one may think of one part as here and another there. 2. And if ſo, though man cannot ſeparate or divide them, if it be no contradiction God can. Various Elements vary in diviſibility: Earth is moſt diviſible: Water more hardly, the parts more inclining to the cloſeſt contact: Air yet more hardly: And if as you think the Subſtance of Fire be material, no doubt the Diſcerpibility is yet harder. And if God have made a Creture ſo ſtrongly inclin'd to the Unity of all the parts, that no other Creture can ſeparate them but God only, as if a Soul were ſuch; it's plain that ſuch a Being need not fear a Diſſolution by ſeparation of parts: For its own Nature hath no tendency to it, but to the contrary, and no fellow Creature hath power to do it, and God will not do it. God maketh all things apt for their uſe, and uſeth things as he hath made them, He made not Marble and Sand alike, nor uſeth them alike. And if he ſhould make a Spirit (e. g. an Anima hujus Vorticis, Solis, Stellae, &c.) Such as he only can divide, but hath no natural tendency to diviſion, but ſo much Indiſcerpibility as no Creature can overcome, this (beſides Scripture) intimateth Gods purpoſe about it.

3. But doubtleſs God and Creatures are both called Spirits equivocally or analogically and not univocally: And it is the vileſt Contradiction to ſay that God is capable of Diviſion: But whether it be ſo with created Spirits I know not: They have paſſivity and God hath none. It's no great Wiſdom to confeſs ones Ignorance; But not to confeſs it is very great folly.

I am ſcarce of your mind, that a man may be in the like puzzle in another World as he was in this, if he methodize not his Thoughts aright. But if it be ſo, you are beſt think again.

§ 2. For Penetrability you ſay, that one Spirit may have a greater Amplitude than another, and that the parts, as I may ſo call them, of the ſame Spirit, may in the Contraction of it ſelf penetrate one another, ſo that there may be a Reduplication of Eſſence through the whole Spirit. Anſ. You tempt me to doubt leſt you talk ſo much againſt materiality of Spirits to hide the name of your own Opinion, for that which others call materiality. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you'l hardly ſo eaſily prove as ſay, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings ſhall I find ſatisfaction, into how much ſpace one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted? And whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-ſhell, or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convexe of all the World.

Ad SECT. X.

§ 1. I Said, [We grant that Spirits have a Quantitas diſcreta; they are numerous, individuate, and Formae ſe multiplicant: Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell, that that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter.] You ſay, [This paſſage is worth our attentive conſideration. And 1. You hence infer Amplitude and Dimenſion of Spirits. Anſw. I meddle not for you, nor againſt you: What's this to me?

§ 2. You ask what are the Formae quae ſe multiplicant? Anſ. Senſitive and Rational as well as Vegetative Spirits: You ſay, That muſt be Creation, or Self-diviſion. Anſ. No; it is but Generation. And in Append. to the Reaſ. of Chriſtian Religion, I have partly ſhewed that Generation is from God as the Prime Cauſe, and yet the Parents Souls as a Second Cauſe, ſo that ſomewhat of a ſort of Creation and Traduction concur: which having further opened in Method. Theol. I here pretermit.

§ 3. But to my Queſtion, Why God cannot make two of one, or one of two, you put me off with this lean Anſwer, that we be not bound to puzzle our ſelves about it. Anſ. I think that Anſwer might ſerve to much of your Philoſophical Diſputes. But if you will puzzle us with a naked Aſſertion of Indiſcerpibility, we muſt ask your proof of it, why God cannot divide and unite extended ample quantitative Spirits? and if he can, how you know that he doth not? or that Indiviſibility is the Form of a Spirit; when as if Water be divided into drops, every drop is Water ſtill.

Ad SECT. XI.

§ 1. IN your further thoughts of this Sect. 11. you do firſt miſ-ſuppoſe that my Queſtion intimateth ſuch a Diviſibility of Souls, as of terrene Bodies into Atoms, or a contrary Union. Terrene Atoms have the moſt imperfect Union. All the Sands on the ſhoar are not only diviſible, but partly divided: I cannot ſay, that all the parts of the Air are ſo; much leſs of the Fire. There is a far cloſer Union of all the Subſtance of that Lucid Calefactive Element, than of Earth, Water, or Air.

§ 2. And here I muſt inſert, that after long thoughts, I doubt not but all things Created are truly one, and truly many: No one particle of the Univerſe is independent on the reſt: Parts they are; as every part of a Clock or Watch: Every Leaf, and Grape, and Apple on the Tree hath a certain individuate or numerical Being, and yet every one is a part of the Tree: And every Herb and Tree is a part of the Garden or Orchard, and that a part of England, &c. and all a part of the Earth in which they grow; and no doubt the Earth is as dependant on other parts of the Univerſe; and all on God. We dream of no total ſeparation of any Creature from the reſt, much leſs Spirits.

But all the Illuminated Air, is more one flamma tenuis (though compound of Air and Fire, and called by us Light) than the Sands are one Earth: And I doubt not but that Fire, which is the Motive, Illuminative, and Calefactive Subſtance, in all the Air, and elſewhere, is yet much leſs diviſible than the Air, and Souls than it: So that ſhould God make many into one, they would be many Individuals no more, but one again Diviſible by God himſelf.

§ 3. And you miſ-ſuppoſe me to ſuppoſe that the whole Subſtance of all Humane Souls, are but the ſame which once in Adam was but one, and from him divided. Writing is a tedious work, becauſe it ſo hardly cauſeth men to underſtand us. I ſuppoſe that a continued Creative Emanation from the Father of Spirits, giveth out all that Spiritual Subſtantiality which becometh new Souls; but that God hath ordained that the Generating Souls ſhall firſt receive this Divine Emanation, and be organical ☞ in communicating it to the Semen▪ and ſo to new organical Bodies; not that the Parents Souls only diſpoſe the ſeminal recipient Matter, but are themſelves partly receptive, and then active in the communication: It will be a defective ſimilitude if I ſay, as a Burning-glaſs by a receptive contraction of the Sun Beams, is inſtrumental in kindling combuſtible matter: Rather as one Candle kindleth a thouſand, and yet the ſubſtance of the Lucid and Calid Being, is communicated from the Ignite Air by the means of that one Candle. (For that it is only Motus a Motu, I believe not.)

That you have drawn me thus effutire quae circa generationem, opinor, muſt help you to be patient with my tediouſneſs. And the rather, becauſe to avoid offending you, I will now paſs by any further Anſwer to your Queries, Whether Adam's Soul was a Legion? which elſe was Adam's Soul? How come they to be Male and Female? was that number of Souls expanded or contracted? what a change by Venery? what becomes of the many Souls in the Chaſt? and the reſt. I would not by a particular Anſwer diſgrace your Queſtions, or the jocular urgent amplifications. No doubt Lights are too low Illuſtrations; but the higheſt within the reach of ſenſe. There was not a Legion of Candles in that which lighted a Legion: nor need I tell you which of the lighted Candles was that which lighted it; nor why lighting more conſumed not the firſt; nor why it kindled a Wax-Candle, and a Tallow-Candle, &c. I knew not till now that you thought Souls differed in Sex, becauſe the Perſons do. But I will not ſtrive againſt your Conceit. The Soul of a Male and Female I better underſtand, than a Male and Female Soul.

§ 4. But you tell me, I muſt conſider the Nature of Light throughly, and I ſhall find it nothing, but a certain motion of a Medium, whoſe particles are ſo or ſo qualified, ſome ſuch way as Carteſianiſm drives at: But here's not Subſtances but Motion communicated, &c.

Anſ. I had as willingly have heard Carteſius tell me any Dream elſe that ever came into his Brain: For this I greatly deſpiſe: And wonder not that any man is ignorant of the nature of Spirits, who is ſo groſly ignorant of the igneous analogical Nature as he was. I have ſaid ſo much in divers Books againſt it, that I will not here in tranſitu any further touch ſo noble a Subject, than to tell you that if you have ſtudied the old Stoicks, Platoniſts, &c. and Patricius, Teleſius, Campanella, Lud. le Grand, &c. as much as Carteſius, I pitty you for believing him. I doubt not the Subſtance of Fire hath a Virtus motiva, as well as illuminativa & catefactiva: And conſequently that Light and Heat are neither of them without Motion: But that they are a tripple operation of the Vna-trina forma ignea, I am paſt doubt, (after as hard ſtudy as you can adviſe me to.) But your terms [certain motion] and an (unnamed) Medium, and particles ſo and ſo qualified, and ſome way, &c. are not notifying terms to me.

That Lumen is ipſe motus methinks a man of half Carteſius's Age ſhould never dream: That it's an effect of Motion many ſay, and think it ſo, as much as Intellection is an effect of mental-Vitality, and Volition of Intellection. But (to lay no ſtreſs on Sir Ken. Digby's Arguments) I make no doubt Ignis lucens is as truly a Subſtance as a Spirit is. If Light be an Act or Quality it hath ſome immediate Agent or Subject: It doth not exiſt ſeparated from them. It is in the Air but as the Recipient, as it is in the Oil of the Candle. The Air ſhineth not of itſelf (as the Night informeth us.) It is therefore a Subſtance that moveth and illuminateth the Air: And if Cartes will call that Subſtance Gl[•]buli aetherei, or mat eria ſubtilis, I need not a game at ſuch toyiſh words: As Motus cauſeth Senſation, and Intellection, which yet by meer motion would never have been cauſed, without the conjunct Acts of the Senſitive and Intellective Faculties as ſuch; ſo is it of Light. Really when I read how far you have eſcaped the deluſions of Carteſianiſm, I am ſorry that you yet ſtick in ſo groſs a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the Nature of Fire, which is the active Principle by which mental and ſenſitive Nature operateth on Man, and Bruits, and Vegetables, and all the paſſive Elements, (if it be not ipſa forma telluris) and all the viſible actions in this lower World are performed, what can that mans Philoſophy be worth? I therefore return your Counſel, ſtudy more throughly the Nature of Aethereal Fire.

I find cauſe to imagine (by your Writings) that you are (as Mr. Glanvile) for the pre-exiſtence of Souls before Generation. And when do you think they were all made? And what Bodies did all the Souls that have ever ſince been in the World animate, when there was no human Body but Adam's and Eve's? Can you conjecture what Animal's they were before they were men's? If you on the one extream (thinking that God made as many Souls, yea Animals the firſt week, as ever are in Being to the end of the World) and the Averrhoiſts on the other extream (who think all Souls are but one individuated by receptive Matter, as one Sun lighteth many Candles by a Burning-Glaſs, and all return as Candles put out, into one again) were to diſpute it out by meer Philoſophy (without the Experience of apparitions,) I know not which would get the better.

Ad SECT. XII, XIII.

THe 12. Section being all meer fiction needs no further Anſwer.

§ 1. It ſeems you call that the [excited Spirit of Nature,] lighting every Candle which other men call Fire: And ſo you will number Fire with Spirits.

§ 2. Your 13. Section is ſtrange. 1. You ſay Penetrability and indiviſibility are not accidents at all, no more than Rationale of a man. Anſ. Anima rationalis is forma hominis in the ſtrict proper ſenſe of Forma as an Active Principle. Indiviſible is a Negative, and it and Penetrable are the conſiſtency or mode of the Subſtance (or, as you call it, Matter:) As Amplitude, Quantity, Spiſſitude, Dimenſions, Locality are by you ſaid to be, which are called Forms in another ſenſe, as the paſſive Elements differ from each other. But the Principium Activum being the true and only Form of a Spirit, theſe modalities and Conſiſtencies are but conditio materiae, as you call it, or Subſtantiae as I call it, as to the Form. Yet that Diſpoſitio materiae is Eſſential I have aſſerted.

§ 3. And yet though all along I deny not your two words to be the conditio omnis Subſtantiae ſpiritualis (joined with more) I ſtill tell you that difficulties make me not lay ſo much on them as you do. To add one more, As I told you Quality is penetrable; as well as Spirit, e. g. heat, ſo yet though we commonly ſay, it is indiviſible, I wiſh you would ſolve this Objection: You prove the locality of Spirits by their operation on this or that Body, (And doubtleſs you may well prove that the Recipient body is in loco, and conſequently the Agent relatively.) But how ſhall we avoid the diviſion of Qualities or Spirits ex diviſione materiae ſubjectivae. E. g. If a red hot Iron be penetrated by the heat, yet if this Iron be cut in two, while hot, and each part ſet (per potentiam ſuperiorem) at 20 Miles diſtance. is not the heat divided with the Iron? So if a mans Head be ſtruck off, and (by ſuch a quick mover as you think moveth the Earth) the Head in a moment were carried far off, while both parts of the Body are yet alive, is not the Soul in each part? And if the Parts were 20 or 100 Miles a ſunder, is it ſtill one undivided Soul?

I can ſay ſomwhat to ſatisfie my ſelf of this; but hardly without croſſing ſomwhat that you ſay.

§ 4. Again when my chief diſſent from you is more againſt your Confidence than your Verity, yet you again tell us, that we know not bare Eſſences, but Eſſential Attributes. I tell you I take not theſe to be notifying Expreſſions: We know ſome Eſſences either intuitively (as Ockam ſaith) or without ſigns, immediately, e. g. what it is to ſee, taſte, hear, ſmell, &c. and what to underſtand and will. And we know other Eſſences Scientia abſtractiva per ſigna. And what good would the knowledge of Attributes elſe do us. Attributes in notione prima are the thing itſelf: And to know an Eſſential Attribute, and to know ipſam Eſſentiam Scientia inadaequata is all one. But an Eſſential Attribute as notio ſecunda, is but ſignum per quod res ſignificata cognoſcenda eſt: And this is knowing the Eſſence too, but ſcientia abſtractivâ: And all is ſcientia valde imperfectâ.

§ 5. You ſay, that Neither the faculty nor Operation of Reaſoning is the Eſſence, and conſequently not rationale.

Anſ. Things of ſo great Moment ſhould not not be obtruded on the World with a bare ipſe dico. The Act of Intellection or Reaſoning is but the Eſſence in hoc modo: but the Faculty is the Eſſential Form of the Soul. When you have confuted the Scotiſts, and my peculiar Diſput. in Meth. Theol. where I think I fully diſprove what you ſay, I may hear you further.

Ad SECT. XIV, XV, XVI.

§ 1 HEre you would firſt know, How I know that the Vitalitas formalis belongs not to Matter, unleſs I have an Antecedent notion of Spirit diſtinct from Matter. Anſ. 1. I conſent not to Dr. Gliſſon, who thought all. Matter had a Vital Form. But I undertake not to prove that God cannot endow any Matter with a Vital Form. And forma denominat; where I find the Form of a Spirit I'le call it Spirit.

2. Dr. Henry Moore in his Metaph. would ask me, how I know that a Helmet may not be made of Paper; and he and I would agree that Paper is not materia diſpoſita, and yet we would not call it Galeae formam.

§ 2. Your denial of Subſtantiality to be ex traduce, I anſwered before; telling you that I think it is both ex emanatione creativa, & ex traduce, but not by either alone; nor all Souls that ever will be, created in Indiſce[•]pible Individuality at once, and tranſmuted from Body to Body.

§ 3. When I ſay, the Negative Immaterial notifieth not the form, you ſay that Immaterial implieth Poſitiveneſs. Anſ. Therefore give us the poſitive notion, or you give us no definition, nor any notifying word.

§ 4. When you ſay, [You believe it is not eaſie to give an Example that materia is put in lieu of ſubſtantia in that adequate ſenſe.] What abundance of Authors could I name you, yea, have I oft named, beſides Dr. Crakenthorp?

§ 5. When you ſay, [All created Subſtance is both Active and Paſſive in ſome ſenſe or other.] It's but to ſay, all words are ambiguous. So all created Subſtance is matter in ſome ſenſe or other. But one would have thought by your oft repeated denial of the ſelf-moving Power of Matter, that you had thought only Spirits have a ſelf-moving power. And if ſo, will you yet ſay, that [this is a diſtinction which diſtinguiſheth nothing?] I think thus, Natura activa as meet a name as Spiritus. And that yet it hath ſome Paſſivity, Damaſcene, yea, and Auguſtine, de Spir. & Anim. c. 8. ſay that is becauſe the Soul [reſpectu incorporei Dei corporea eſt.] though in reſpect to our Bodies it is Incorporeal: Other Fathers ſay much more, but I juſtify not their words.

§ 6. Ad 15. Sect. I pretend not to have ſuch an Idaea of Spiritual Subſtance, as to denominate its conſiſtence more fitly than by Purity, a word which you alſo uſe, yet not denying your ſeveral Attributes.

§ 7. As to your Doctrine of Atomes, I think no wiſe man dare ſay that God made matter firſt in divided Atomes, and after ſet them together. But that God is able to divide all matter into Atomes or indiviſible parts I doubt not. The Virtus Formalis of Spirits (and ſo ſome qualities) conſiſt not of Atomes: But how far God can divide the ample Subſtance of them, I only tell you, that I know not; and to pretend to know it would be none of my Wiſdom. Your Attributes of amplitude, quantity, dimenſions, imply that God made ſome Spirits bigger in amplitude than others, as well as Virtutis ſortioris. You think I ſuppoſe that which you call the Spirit of the World, or Nature, bigger in amplitude than the Spirit of a Wren.

§ 8. Ad Sect. 16. You that ſay, Spirits have Extenſion and Spiſſitude, ſay that ſpiſſitude ſignifieth more ſubſtance in leſs compaſs. And theſe Phraſes ſound liker to Corporeity than any that I have uſed: More ſubſtance and leſs ſubſtance, ſpiſſitude by Contraction ſignifie much change, and ſignifie that which the Intellect may diſtinguiſh into partes extra partes, though undivided which would increaſe a mans doubt, whether God be not able to make a bigger Spirit leſs, and a leſs bigger, and to ſeparate the parts that are ſo diſtinguiſhable in amplitude, and to make one into two, or two into one.

§ 9. Whether Aether or Fire be material, methinks you ſhould be as uncertain at leaſt as I. For you ſay Light is but motus, of ſomwhat exciting the Spirit of the World. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the neareſt cauſe of Illumination by way of Natural activity, than that which you call the Spirit of the World, I call Fire; and ſo we differ but de nomine. But I have oft profeſt my Ignorance whether Fire, and the Vegetative Nature be all one, (which I encline to think) or whether Fire be a middle active Nature between the Spiritual and the meer paſſive, by which Spirits work on Bodies. I think I ſhall quickly know all this better than you do.

Ad SECT. XVII, XVIII, XIX.

§ 1. OF your Doctrine of Atomes I ſpake before: I have no mind to examine the weight of your Reaſons publickly.

§ 2. I thought you that ſo extol the Atomiſts Doctrine, would have deigned to read at leaſt ſome of the Leaders of the various Sects: And my undervaluing them is no excuſe to you: for as you knew not my judgment, ſo I ſuppoſe you do not much eſteem it. That which I blame them for, is, that Lud. le Grand over-magnifieth Fire, Teleſius and Campanella over-magnifie Heat, Patricius over-magnifieth Light, as Carteſius doth Motion: But if the one Principle of Motion, Light, and Heat, had been better handled as one, (as it is) it had been ſounder.

§ 3. I need not your hydroſtatical experiment of the riſing Rundle to convince me of the Motion of the matter of the World by a ſpiritual power: I doubt as little of Spirits as of Bodies: But I underſtand not what greater wonder there is in the riſing of your Rundle, than in the riſing of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea; or that the heavieſt body ſhould ſink loweſt if it have way. Whether Water conſiſt of oblong flexible Bodies, I am not much regardful to know: Each of thoſe oblong ones are diviſible into Atomes.

§ 4. But as to what hence you infer of Fire, I make no doubt but the Flames and the red hot Iron are compouud things; and that the oily or ſulphureous matter moved and heated, is the Subſtance which we ſee. But I believe not that bare motion as motion, were it never ſo ſwift, wo'd cauſe this: But that theſe effects are cauſed in the capable matter by the ſpecial action of a permeant Subſtance in itſelf inviſible as Subſtance, whoſe form is the Active Virtue of moving, illuminating, and heating, and ſo is ſenſible only in this triple Effect. And if you call this a Spirit I leave you to your Liberty.

Ad SECT. XX. XXI.

§ 1. THE ſeven Propoſitions which you find in my words I own, ſave that the fourth ſhould be thus formed [That the Subſtantiae diſpoſitio in fire diſtinct from the form, beareth ſome ſuch Analogy to a Spirit (if it be not one, viz. Vegetative) that may ſomewhat ſerve us to conceive of it thereby, and they that from this Analogy, call it Ignis non formaliter ſed eminenter, are excuſable; though it can be no ſtrict proper name that cometh not a forma.

§. 2. Ad ſect. 21. But you ask [Whether by Active power I mean a power alwaies exerting itſelf into act, ſo that this fire is alwaies moving, enlightning, and hot formaliter, elſe why ſhould it be called Ignis?]

Anſ. Anſwer your ſelf, when you ſpeak of a power of Senſation, and Intellection and Volition in a Soul, do you mean a power alwaies exerting itſelf into ſenſation, Intellection and Volition, elſe why is it called a Soul.] Anſ. 2. I mean a power which hath alwaies an inclination to Act; & hath its own ſecret immanent act, & alwaies acts ad extra, when it hath fit recipient objects. As to your oft mentioned Confutation of Judge Hale, having not read it, I am no Judge of your performance.

You Queſtion what is this new igneous ſubſtance never heard of before] while in all Ages it hath been ſo famous a controverſy; when not only the Stoicks but moſt old Philoſophers gave to it ſo much more than meet; when Lud. Le Grand, would make us believe that it was almoſt the only God of all the Heathen World, under various names, and while ſo many new Sects have written ſo many volumes of it, who would have believed that even Dr. Henry More had never heard of it before?

To your queſtion, Is it material or immaterial?] I ſtill anſwer, material is a word of larger or narrower ſenſe, ambiguous: I know that it hath the aforeſaid Actions: And by them I know that it hath the Power ſo to act: and by both I know it is a ſubſtance capable of ſuch power & Acts: And I know that the ſubſtance is inviſible in ſe, but ſeen in its Effects. And my brain is too dark to be confident of more: Let him that knoweth more boaſt of it.

§ 3. You ſay [A material Fire diſtinct from the flame of a Candle, or Fire-ſtick, or red hot Iron, there is no more ground for, than material Water diſtinct from Wells, Rivers, Seas, &c.]

Anſ. Do you not take Carteſius materia ſubtilis, if not globuli aetherei, to be inviſible, & not alwaies appearing in Candles or Fire-ſticks? If a Soul may be a ſenſitive and intellective Subſtance, and yet not be alwaies feeling or underſtanding, why may there not be Fire where it ſhineth not. It ſeemeth you take not the illuminated Air to be Ignite, becauſe it is not a Candle or Fire-ſtick: I doubt not but Fire is a Subſtance permeant and exiſtent in all mixt Bodies on Earth; & in ipſa tellure; in Minerals; in your Blood it is the prime part of that called the Spirits, which are nothing but the Igneous Principle in a pure aerial Vehicle, and is the Organ of the Senſitive Faculties of the Soul: And if the Soul carry away any Vehicle with it, it's like to be ſome of this. I doubt you take the ſame thing to be the Spirit of the world, while you ſeem to vilifie it.

§ 4. It's ſtrange when I tell you that I conceive of a Spirit but as Ignis eminenter, and not formaliter, that you ſhould ſtill ask whether I take it not for Ignis formaliter? I have often ſaid, that I think Subſtances differ ſo gradually, that the lower [•]ath ſtill ſome Analogy to the higher: And I ſtill ſay that Natura Mentalis, & ſenſitiva are not Ignis formaliter; But whether the Natura Vegetativa be any other than ipſe ignis I know not; but think it is no other. Do you that better know its conſiſtence call it Spirit or not as you pleaſe.

Ad Sect. 22. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.

§ 1. YOU puzzle me more and more: Before you ſaid, Fire is nothing but motion of ſulphureous particles, and only in Candles, Fire-ſticks, hot Irons, &c. And yet now [The vehicles of Angels are Igneous or aethereal.] Is an Angel only in a Candle or hot Iron, &c. Is motion, yea motion of ſulphureous particles their vehicle? If they are Animals, and have bodies, as you think, they are ſuch as deſerve a nobler Character.

§ 2. I tell you ſtill, the Greek Fathers I think, as well as I, call'd mental and ſenſitive Spirits, Ignis, but Analogically, which you call Symbolically: If that ſatisfy you what have you all this while diſputed againſt? And if Fire be the vehicle of Angels it is a ſubſtance. And when you ſe[•] the Motion, Light, and feel the heat, d[•] you think, what ever is the Recipient moved Matter, that the inviſible Mover is not preſent and contiguous? It is that immediate mover which I call Fire, and am fully ſatisfied doth it not by Motion only, but the exerting of its triple Virtue.

§ 3. You confeſs, Sect. 24. the common uſe of the name of Fire applied to Souls by the old Philoſophers: and ſtill you ſay it was but Symbolically: and did they find no Reaſon to make Fire a Symbol rather than Earth or Water. When I ſtill tell you that it is only analogically that Souls may be called Fire, did you fairly to pretend the contrary?

§ 4. Yea Sect. 25. You are at it again, ſaying that [I ſeem to conceive the Fathers to ſpeak not ſymbolically, but properly.] Anſ. where and when did I ſay any ſuch thing? will you tell the world that a Man holds that which he never ſaid, and hath oft written againſt, and write a Book againſt him on ſuch a ſuppoſition, and at laſt have nothing to ſay but Putarem? I uſe not the words Symbolical and Proper; they are not preciſe enough for this ſubject: I ſaid more when I ſaid that Souls and Angels are called fire, only eminenter & analogice, but not formaliter: and forma dat nomen.

But you are offended that I ſay thoſe Greek Fathers ſpake tolerably and informingly, and you ſay, It was miſchievouſly, inducing men to believe the Soul mortal. For Light may be blown out, and hot Iron cooled. Anſ. Alas! What dry Philoſophy is this of Fire? Is any thing annihilated when the Candle goeth out? Was there not an inviſible active principle moving your ſuppoſed ſulphureous particles, which was as immediate an Agent as your Soul is of Senſation or Intellection: which remaineth the ſame? But indeed it is Air and not Sulphur which is the firſt and neareſt Recipient of the illuminating Act, and is Conjux Ignis, I ſuppoſe you'l ſay, The Spirit of the World doth this. Anſ. Call it by what name you will, It is a pure active Subſtance, whoſe form is the Virtus motiva, illuminativa & calefactiva; I think the ſame which when it operateth on due ſeminal matter is Vegetative. But the World hath Spiritual Natures more noble than this; viz. ſenſitive and intellective.

§ 5. Ad Sect. 26. You ſay againſt the Fathers, [When we enquire into the diſtinct Nature of things we muſt bid adieu to Metaphors.] Anſ. When I am ignorant of my own Ignorance, I will hear you, I am far from dreaming that I have one formal Conception of God, but only Analogical: Only that of Ens is diſputed between the Thomiſts and Scotiſts, whether it be Univocal de Deo & Creaturis. And here Analogical is but Metaphorical: And yet it is not nothing to ſee as in a Glaſs & enigmatically. And when I can perceive that your two hard words do not only ſignifie more than negatively and modally, or qualitatively, but alſo give us an Idea of a Spirit which hath nothing Metaphorical, but all formal, I ſhall magnifie them more than I do.

§ 6. You ſay we muſt ſearch out the adequate defi[•]ition.] Anſ. That [adequate] is a word too big for me: I dare ſay that you have not an adequate knowledg of any thing in the World; not of one Fly or Flea or Pile of Graſs: And can you make adequate Definitions of Angels and all Spirits? Even who before twice told us that we know not the intimate eſſence of things, but the Attributes? Indeed I perceive your Attributes are ſuch as will not notifie Eſſences. I ask my own experience whether Indiſcerpible is a word that giveth any Idea of the Eſſence, ſave negative (that it cannot be torn into pieces) and modal? and I find no other that it maketh on my Mind.

The common note of Matter is, that it hath partes extra partes: and I think you thus make Spirits material. You make them parts of the compound Animal: and you deny them to be toti in toto; and you give them locality, & amplitude, & quantity. And if ſo, though they be indiſcerpible, they have continued parts intelligible; and that part of the Soul is not in one hand which is in the other: and as partes Animalis they are actually ſeparable from the matter. The Spiritus Mundi you ſuppoſe to be a great continued amplitude or extended Subſtance. And Atomes are in ſome Elements a cloſely continued Subſtance. You ſeem to make all Subſtance to be Atomes, ſpiritual atomes and material atomes. And I am not ſure that God cannot make material atomes ſo continued a matter as that no Creature can diſcerp them: is it any contradiction? and I doubt not but Souls and Angels are ſo indiviſible, as that their Nature tendeth to continued, undivided Unity, and no Creature can divide them. But that God cannot do it I cannot ſay.

Even of the Souls Mortality not only Arnobius, but many other Chriſtian Writers maintain, that it is mortal naturâ, but immortal ex dono; which is unfitly ſpoken but well meant: that is, God hath made their Natures ſuch as have no tendency in themſelves to a Diſſolution or Deſtruction, but not ſuch as he cannot diſſolve or deſtroy; Yea I doubt not but without a continued Divine Suſtentation, all the World would in a moment be annihilated; Preſervation being a continued ſort of Creation. Your owning nothing in Fire but what's viſible, I have ſpoke to.

Ad SECT. XXVIII.

§ 1. THat Spirits are each Ens unum per ſe, ſo as to have no divided parts, or ſuch as tend to diſſolution I doubt not: that they are each one by the continued uniting Influx of that God who continueth their Being, and ſo far per aliud, is paſt doubt. You here make Metaphyſical Monades abſurd and ridiculous. But is not that a Monad and Atome which is one and indiviſible? though it be not minimum: and if your Penetrability imply not that all the ſingular Spirits can contract themſelves▪ into a punctum; yea, that all the Spirit of the World may be ſo contracted, I find it not yet ſufficiently explained: For you never tell us into how little parts only it may be contracted: And if you put any limits I will ſuppoſe that one Spirit hath contracted itſelf into the leaſt compaſs poſſible; and then I ask, cannot another and another Spirit be in the ſame compaſs by their Penetration; If not, Spirits may have a contracted Spiſſitude which is not penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but only dilated ones. If yea, then quaero whether all created Spirits may not be ſo contracted.

And I ſhould hope that your Definition of Spirit excludeth not God; and yet that you do not think that his Eſſence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

And as to your rejection of Metaphors I ſay, the very name Spiritus which you uſe is a Metaphor: rhe firſt ſenſe being our Breath à ſpirando, or the Air or Wind: Martinius nameth no fewer than Fifteen ſenſes of it, and Wiſdom itſelf ſaid, 1 Cor. 15. There is a natural Body, and there is a ſpiritual Body.

§ 2. You add, [If you will ſay, that if he ſhould create ſuch a Spirit with metaphyſical Amplitude, which though ſo large himſelf cannot divide, and ſever into parts, he would thereby puzzle his own Omnipotency, at this rate he ſhall be allowed to create nothing, no not ſo much as matter, nor himſelf indeed to be.

Anſ. I had rather tremble at this than boldly anſwer it. Whatever is a contradiction cannot be; and it is not for want of power that God cannot do it: It is no work of power: Had you proved it a Contradiction for God, to make two Spirits of one, or one of two, you had done that part in an eaſier way, which I ſhould not gainſay. But this Speech of yours is as if you ſaid, [He denieth God to be the Creator, or to be God, who ſaith that God is able to divide an Ample ſpiritual Subſtance; that is, who ſaith, that this is no contradiction, and that God is Almighty: when our Creed ſaith, that God is the Father Almighty maker of Heaven and Earth. Cannot he alter or annihilate his own works: Before he made the World, he could have made the ample Subſtance of the Spirit of the World into many Spirits: And is he leſs able ſo to change it? If Spirits be unified as the Bodies which they animate, cannot God make many Bodies into one? Cannot he make many Stars into one? And then would that one have many unifying Spirits, or but one? It's a thing ſo high as required ſome ſhew of proof, to intimate that God cannot be God, if he be Almighty, and cannot conquer his own Omnipotency.

§ 3. Your words like an intended Reaſon are [For that cannot be God, from whom all other things are not produced & created.] Anſ. 1. Relatively (as a God to us) it's true; though quoad exiſtentiam Eſſentiae he was God before the Creation. 2. But did you take this for any ſhew of a proof? The ſenſe implied is this, [All things are not produced and created by God, if a ſpiritual ample Subſtance be diviſible by his Omnipotency that made it: Yea, then he is not God. Negatur Conſequentia.

Ad SECT. XXIX, XXX, XXXI.

§ 1. YOU ſay your definition is more informing than defining a Spirit by Fire, viz. [a Spirit is an immaterial ſubſtance indued with Life, and the faculty of Motion] and virtually containing in it Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility] Anſ. 1. Your definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. The ſame things need not be ſo very oft repeated in anſwer to you: but briefly I ſay; if by Immaterial you mean not [without ſubſtance] it ſignifieth truth: but a negation ſpeaketh not a formal eſſence. 2. Spirit is itſelf but a Metaphor. 3. Intrinſecal, indued with Life, tells us not that it is the form: Qualities and proper accidents are intrinſecal. 4. The [faculty of motion] is either a tautology included in life, or elſe if explicatory of life, it is defective; or if it diſtribute Spirits into two ſorts, vital and motive, it ſhould not be in the common definition. 5. No Man can underſtand that the negative [Immaterial] by the terms, includeth Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility. 6 You do not ſay here that they are the form, but elſewhere you do: and the form ſhould be expreſt, and not only virtually contained as you ſpeak. 7. They are not the form, but the Diſpoſitio vel conditio ad formam. 8. If ſuch modalities or conſiſtence were the form, more ſuch ſhould be added which are left out. 9. Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility are two notions, and you ſhould not give us a compound form. 10. Yea you compound them with a quite different notion, [Life and the faculty of motion:] which is truly the form, and is one thing, and not compounded of notions ſo different, as Conſiſtence and Virtue or Power.] 11. You ſay Life intrinſecally iſſues from this immaterial ſubſtance: But the form is concreated with it, and iſſues not from it.

You mean well: It is informing truth which you intend, and offer to the world. And we are all greatly beholden to you for ſo induſtrious calling fooliſh ſenſualiſts to the ſtudy and notion of inviſible beings, without which what a Carkaſs or nothing were the world. But all our conceptions here muſt have their allowances, and we muſt confeſs their weakneſs.

And you might have informed us of all that you know, without fathering opinions on others, which they never owned, and then nicknaming them from your own fiction: As if we ſaid that Souls are fire, and alſo took fire as you do for Candles, and hot Irons, &c. only.

§ 2. Now I that pretend not to a perfect definition repeat that which is the neareſt to it that I underſtand.

And firſt I am for agreeing on the ſenſe of words before we uſe them in definitions.

1. I take not the word [Spirit] to be of univocal ſignification here, but ſo analogical as to be equivocal. God and Creatures are not univocally called [Spirits.] 2. I know not (and I think no other) that all Created Spirits in the univerſe are ſo far of one ſubſtantial conſiſtence as that the word [Spirit] univocally fits them all, as a Genus among the 15 ſenſes of the word before ſaid mentioned by Martinius; when we confine it to one, men are apt to boggle at the ambiguity: yet when we have defined it, the name is to be uſed.

3. Materia is as ambiguous as Spiritus; and is oft uſed for Res or Subſtantia, which is fundamental to modes and qualities and active forms: and oft for ſubſtance of ſuch a conſiſtence as is ſenſible (to the higheſt ſenſes) and as a mind in the fleſh can have an Idea of in its conſiſtence; and if you will, ſuch as you call Impenetrable and Diſcerpible.

4. The word [ſubſtance] itſelf, if uſed only to ſignifie, either Quoddity and not Quiddity; (as Ens for Quod eſt, and not Quid eſt, and ſubſiſtit for aliquid ſubſiſtit; not telling what) or relatively only for Quod ſubſtat accidentibus; or negatively for Quod non eſt accidens; ſed aliquid ſubſiſtens in ſe, and include not the notion of Res fundamentalis, is not fit here to be uſed as a Genus; but in this ſenſe it is.

5. Forma being oft taken for ſubſtantiae figura, and oft for the contexture of corporeal parts making it receptive of Motion, and oft for the union of the moving and the moved parts, and oft for the moving principle in a compound, and oft for the Motive or Active Virtue in a ſimple ſubſtance, but ever ſtrictly for the ſpecifick conſtitutive cauſe, per quam res eſt id quod eſt; I take it to be but improperly and equivocally applied to the meer Receptive conſiſtence preſuppoſed to the form.

Theſe things ſuppoſed. I preſume not to give a definition of God, but ſuch a deſcription as we can reach.

Suppoſing the word [Nature] to ſignify in general [Quoddity and Quiddity] I firſt diſtinguiſh [Nature] into Active and Paſſive: By Active I mean that Nature which hath a formal Power, Virtue, and Inclination to Activity. By Paſſive I mean that Nature which having no ſuch Active form, is formed to receive the Influx of the Active.

I refuſe not to call the firſt Spirit: but becauſe they ſo greatly differ, I chooſe rather the common name of Active Nature; being not metaphorical.

2. I ſuppoſe there is no ſuch thing as Spirit (or Active Nature) which is not ſome ſpecies of Spirit: Therefore I give no definition of [Spirit] or Active NaNature in general, for where there is no form and no ſpecies there is no proper definition. And all Spirit being actually Mental, Senſitive or Vegetative, and every thing having but one univocal form, I name no form but of each ſpecies, but as in compounds, ſo in ſimples we mentally diſtinguiſh the materia (vel ſubſtantia) Diſpoſitio & forma.

Therefore defining only the ſpecies, I define, Naturam Mentalem to be [ſubſtantia Puriſſima Virtuoſiſſima, Virtute ſcilicet Formali Vitaliter-Activa, Intellectiva, Volitiva (una-trina:) I define Naturam Animalem ſeu ſenſitivam, to be [ſubſtantia Purior Virtuoſior, ſcilicet, virtute Vitali-Activa ſenſitiva, Perceptiva-ſenſitiva, Appetitiva-ſenſitiva.

I have told you oft enough why I ſay Puriſſima, including as much of your [Immaterial, Penetrable, Indiſcerpible] and more, as is really the ſubſtantiae diſpoſitio; and if you will call it as ſome do forma diſpoſitiva, I quarrel not: But I uſe [Puriſſima] 1. to avoid many words, and 2. To avoid pretending to more diſtinct conceptions of ſpiritual conſiſtencies than I find any idea of in my mind.

I uſe but the Comparative degree of [Purior and Virtuoſior] to ſenſitives, not being ſure that there is not a gradual difference in both conſiſtency and virtue in theſe ſpecies of Spirits.

I define the Vegetative Nature, ſuppoſing it to be ipſe Ignis, to be [ſubſtantia Pura, Virtu[•]ſa, ſcilicet Virtute formali Activa, Illuminativa, Calefactiva; by which prime operations it cauſeth Vegetation, & thereby in plants, Diſcretionem, Attractionem, Digeſtionem, &c. by an Analagous perception, appetite and motion. But theſe actions belong to compounds; And I ſtill profeſs my ſelf in this alſo uncertain, whether Natura Vegetativa and Ignea be all one: or whether Ignis be Natura organica by which the three ſuperior operate on the Paſſive. But I incline moſt to think that they are all one; when I ſee what a Glorious Fire the Sun is, and what operation it hath on Earth, and how unlikely it is that ſo glorious a ſubſtance, ſhould not have as noble a formal Nature as a plant. And I take all the ſuperior Virtues to be the inferior, eminenter, and the inferior to have analogy to the ſuperiour.

Your frequent repetitions draw me to this repetition. If we agree in the definitions, I will not contend about any name.

And I confeſs if you could prove that Indiviſibility is proper to any ſpecies, then it would be a contradiction for it to be that ſpecies, and yet to be diviſible, and ſo it would be no act of Omnipotency to do it. But as in Materials, ſo as far as I can conceive in Spirituals, to make two into one is no change of the Nature of the things, nor to make one into two. This belongs to Individuation, and not to ſpecification.

Who can doubt but God being all in all things, he is as intimate to us as our Souls to our bodies, and more: And tho the Schools commonly ſay, that God hath no Accidents, pardon my diſſent who doubt not he hath the accidents of Relations, and dare not ſay that all the world is not Dei Accidens, while in him we live, and move, and have our being: for I will not, and I do not think that it is Pars Dei, as if he were but Anima mundi, and yet I will not ſay that the world hath no entity or ſubſtance; nor yet that the entity of God and the world, is more than the entity (or ſubſtance) of God alone; for to be Minor or Pars is below God. But Accidents though no parts are ſubſtantiae accidentia. And though I think the Fryar (Benedictus de Benedictis) in Regula Perfectionis ſpeaketh fanatically when he taketh it to be perfection to ſuppoſe we ſee and know no being but God; yet we muſt know nothing quite ſeparate from God, and that hath not ſome dependent union with him. And yet while all things are in God, and ſo inſeparable from him that nothing but annihilation can totally ſeparate them, yet they are multitudes in themſelves, and wicked Men and Devils are ſeparated from the influx of his Grace and Glory. And the human nature of Chriſt hath ſome nearer union with God than other Creatures have. And ſo I doubt not but every Creature is ſo united to the univerſe, that nothing but annihilation can totally ſeparate it from the reſt; and yet this is conſiſtent with individuation. I remember when I told him whom you ſo oft mention of Auguſtines words de Anima, in which he ſeemeth to favour the ſaying that [All Souls are one, and yet many] rather than that [All Souls are one and not many] or [many and not one] he ſeemed much taken with it: all which I mention to infer that there is a ſeparability (from God and the univerſe) which is no way poſſible but by annihilation; and in compounds ſome ſeparation of parts will change the ſpecies; and if it were proveable which Aquinas holds, that no two Angels are not of diſtinct Species, then every alteration of the individual might alter the Species; but yet it wo'd be a Spirit.

And I have long thought that ſo much ſelfiſhneſs as is our ſin or imperfection, is a potent cauſe of making all men more regardful of Individuation and fearful of loſing it by Union of Spirits than they ought; and that holy Souls will be nearlier one with Chriſt and one another than we can here deſire or conceive; and yet Individuation ſecundum quid at leaſt, ſhall be continued. But yet I ſay, while there is numerus animarum, and it is uncertain whether alſo each Orb hath not one, and you plead for Amplitude, and Minority, (Quantity) and the Bodies animated may as vaſtly differ as a Flea, or a Wren, or a Pigmy, and the Sun, it is quite above my reach to know that a change of Individuals, by making one many, or many one, is a contradiction, and ſo impoſſible.

And as to Penetrability I repeat, that ſeeing by Penetration I ſuppoſe you mean not piercing inter partes, but poſſeſſing the ſame place with other things, and contraction of itſelf, into leſs amplitude, as I know not how a thing that hath no parts (and that extra partes) can contract itſelf into leſs ſpace, (which is to contract parts that are no parts) ſo I cannot ſee but ſuch Contraction and Colocality muſt needs be limited, ſo as that all the World cannot be deſerted and mortified by all Spirits Contraction to one narrow ſpace; nor yet that at once every Spirit is every where; and when the Contraction and Colocality is come to the narroweſt poſſible, in that ſtate Spirits muſt needs be further impenetrable, that is, no more can be in that ſpace.

So that while I am paſt doubt, that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do naturally abhor ſeparation, and ſo are inſeparable, unleſs God will ſeparate them, and ſo there is no fear of altering the Individuation much leſs the ſpecies of Souls; I there ſtop and will put no more into my definitions of Souls or Spirits than I know, at leaſt as ſtrongly probable, much leſs by laying the formal Eſſence on a Compoſition of hard & doubtful words, tempt all to believe tkat the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as thoſe words are.

Ad SECT. XXIII.

§ 1. YOu ſaid, [That a Spirit is Ens, ideoque verum, and that True implieth a right matter and form duly conjoined.] To which I ſaid, [Do you not here make Spirits material?] You anſwered, [I do not make Spirits material in any ſenſe derogatory to their Nature and Perfections.]

Reply. Nor do thoſe that I excuſed: ſo then after all theſe Sections, you make Spirits conſiſt of Matter and form, in a ſenſe agreeable to their nature and perfection: And ſo de nomine, you come nearer thoſe that you accuſe than I do.

§ 2. But you ſay, [That Matter and Form I there ſpeak of, is a Matter and Form that belongs to Ens quatenus Ens— in a moſt general notion preſcinded from all kinds of Being whatever, and therefore belongs to Beings Immaterial.]

Anſ. If you may ſay Quidvis de quovis, lay not too great ſtreſs on words. Ens quatenus Ens hath no Form, nor proper Matter. Ens is that terminus incomplexus, to whoſe Conception all other are reſolved. Therefore every other conception incomplex or complex, muſt add ſomwhat to it. It can be no Genu[•], or Species: If it have any kind of Matter and Form it is more than Ens quatenus Ens: And ſure that which is [preſcinded from all particular kinds of Being, is preſcinded from Material and Immaterial, unleſs the word [particular] be a Cothurnus. To ſay that Ens hath Matter and Form, is to ſay more than Ens, a moſt general notion, as you call it.

But if Ens as the moſt general notion, have Matter and Form, then ſo hath Spirits, and every ſubordinate; for the general is in them all.

§ 3. But you ſay, [It's only materia & forma logica.] To which I anſwered before. That's but to ſay, It is notio ſecunda, which if it be not fitted ad primam, or ut ſignum ad rem ſignificandam, it is falſe. And we ſuppoſe you to mean to ſpeak truly and aptly. If you ſhould mean neither materia ex qua, nor in qua, but circa quam, ſo Form may be Matter.

§ 4. You ſay, [Nor is the Form adjoined in a Phyſical Senſe to the Matter, unleſs where the Form and Matter are Subſtances really diſtinct.

Anſ. 1. I believe not this to be true: If it be, then only Compounds have Form and Matter; but I think Simples have Matter and Form, that are not two Subſtances but one. As I have oft ſaid, Dr. Gliſſon after others moſt ſubtilly laboureth to prove it of every ſimple Subſtance, that its Matter and Form are not compounding parts, but Conceptus inadaequati: If the Intellect compound and divide its own Conceptions that maketh not a real Compoſition of two Subſtances in the objects, but as the Scotiſts call it, of two Formalities, or Conceptus objectivi: which if you will call a Logical Compoſition or Intellectual, if you explain it, the matter is ſmall. But beſides that Earth, Water and Air have their Matter and differencing Forms, which are not two Subſtances, ſo hath Fire in a more noble ſenſe if it be material: And by your Application of the word [Phyſical] you ſeem to extend it to Spirits: And if ſo, I am paſt doubt that the Subſtance and Form of Spirits are not two diſtinct conjoined Subſtances.

Too many Logicians have hitherto taken the Potentia naturalis, or Faculties of the Soul to be accidents in the Predicament of Quality: Let them call them Qualities if they pleaſe, but the Scotiſts have fully prov'd them to be no Accidents, but the formal Eſſence of the Soul, (and I have anſwered all Zabarell's Arguments ubi ſup.) And this Virtus formalis, (vel facultas, vel potentia activa) is not a Subſtance joined to a Subſtance, but the form of a ſimple Subſtance. But I perceive by your next words that you approve all this, and ſpeak only of mental Compoſition as to Spirits. And I ſay that the Mind ſhould conceive, and the Tongue ſpeak of things as they are, and not at once deny Materiality to Spirits, and call them Logically material; or at leaſt bear with others that ſay but the ſame. If Logical Matter ſpeak not Subſtantiality at leaſt, it is deluſive.

Your Interminata amplitudo ſounds ſo like Infinita, that I am not willing to ſay that no Spirit hath any Terminos Subſtantiae.

Ad SECT. XXXIII, XXXIV.

The Concluſion.

§ 1. YOu ſay that I wrote not ſo curtly, but that I have ſufficiently conveyed my mind to you.] anſ. I would have done ſo, had I dream'd of your Printing it. But that I did not, appeareth by your grand Miſtake, as if I [〈◊〉] aſſerted that materiality of Spirits which is proper to Bodies.

§. 2. As in all, our difference lieth in a much ſmaller matter than you thought. ſo in your great deſign of convincing the blinded Sadduces of this Age, and in the truly pious Concluſion in your 34. Sect. I not only agree with you, but in my own name, and many others, humbly tender you unfeigned Thanks.

§ 3. And becauſe I would not ſeem more diſtant from you than I am, I ſhall firſt tell you, that on theſe Subjects your thoughts and mine have been ſo long working to the ſame ends & much in the ſame way, that, 1655. your Book againſt Atheiſm and my popular diſcourſes of the unreaſonableneſs of Infidelity coming out together, we both uſed many of the ſame Hiſtories of Apparitions, Witches, &c. for Confirmation; and in that Book of yours, you have theſe following words, which if they are not (as I think they are not) miſchievous, it's like mine of the ſame importance are not ſo, nor are more ſo proved by you than your own.

Antid. Li. 1. p. 17. [The parts of a Spirit can be no more ſeparated though they be dilated, than you can cut off the Rays of the Sun by a pair of Sciſſars made of pellucide Chryſtal.]

Appen. p. 304. [Suppoſe a point of Light, from which rayes out a luminous Orb according to the known Principles of Optiques: This Orb of Light doth very much reſemble the Nature of a Spirit, which is diffuſed and extended, and yet indiviſible: For wee'l ſuppoſe in this Spirit the Center of Life to be indiviſible, and yet to diffuſe itſelf by a kind of circumſcribed Omnipotency, as the point of Light is diſcernible in every point of the luminous Sphere. And yet ſuppoſing that central lucid point indiviſible, there is nothing diviſible in all that Sphere of Light. For it is ridiculous to think of any Engine or Art whatſoever to ſeparate the luminous Raies from the ſhining Center, and keep them apart by themſelves, as any man will acknowledge that does but conſider the thing we ſpeak of. Now there is no difficulty to imagine ſuch an Orb as this, as Subſtance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of Light itſelf, it not inhering in any Subject in the place it occupieth, looks far more like a Subſtance than any Accident. And what we fanry unadviſedly to befal Light and Colours, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in ſpiritual Subſtances, whoſe central Eſſence ſpreads out into a ſecondary Subſtance, as the luminous Rays are conceived to ſhoot out from a lucid point. From whence we are enabled to return an Anſwer to the greateſt difficulty in the foregoing Objection, viz. That the conceived parts in a Spirit have an inſeparable dependance on the central Eſſence, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an extenſion of this whole ſubſtantial power, yet one part is not ſeparable or diſcerpible from another, but the entire Subſtance, as well ſecondary as primary, or central, is indiviſible. But let us again caſt our Eyes on this lucid point and radiant Orb we have made uſe of: It is manifeſt that thoſe Raies that are hindered from ſhooting out ſo far as they would, need not loſe their Virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward their ſhining Center; and the Obſtacle being removed they may ſhoot out to their full length again: ſo that there is no Generation of a new Ray.—

And p. 357. [When I ſpeak of Indiviſibility that imagination create not new troubles to her ſelf, I mean not ſuch an Indiviſibility as is fancied in a Mathematical point, but as we conceive in a Sphere of Light made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that Sphere or Orb of Light, though it be in ſome ſenſe extended, yet it is truly indiviſible, ſuppoſing the Center ſuch. For there is no means imaginable to diſcerpe or ſeparate any one Ray of this Orb, and keep it apart by itſelf disjoined from the Center.

Now a little to invert the Property of this luminous Orb, when we would apply it to a Soul or Spirit: As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is neceſſarily in every part of the Orb, ſo there is alſo that Vnity and Indiviſibility of the exterior parts, if I may ſo call them, of a Spirit or Soul, with their inmoſt Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of Life is thereby alſo neceſſarily affected, and theſe exteriour parts of the Soul being affected by the parts of the Object with ſuch Circumſtances as they are in, the inward Center receives all ſo circumſtantiated, that it hath neceſſarily the entire and unconfuſed Images of things without, though they be contrived into ſo ſmall a compaſs, and are in the very Center of this ſpiritual ſubſtance. This Symbolical Repreſentation I uſed before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better ſet off the nature of a Spirit, &c.]

Here is the ſame and more than I have ſaid, unleſs you think Light here to be no Fire; but take Light for a Subſtance, and Fire but for Motion: which if you ſay, I am willing to believe you will recal.

And that a Spirit is in its Contraction impenetrable, let your words teſtifie, p. 312.

[〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] I define thus: A Power in a Spirit of offering ſo near to a corporeal Emanation from the Center of Life, that it will ſo perfectly fill the Receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impoſſible for any other Spirit to poſſeſs the ſame, and of hereby becoming ſo firmly and cloſely united to a Body, as both to actuate and be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.

So here is a Spirit when it hath filled a Body, that can no more be penetrated by another Spirit or Body; and ſo in this contracted ſtate is impenetrable. So that this is but bringing diffuſed parts cloſer together, and then no other can be in the ſame place. And is this the neceſſary Form of a Spirit?

But may not this extenſion and Indiviſibili[•]y alſo be omitted as too hard, without all the miſchief mentioned by you, and a truer notifying Form found out?

Let us hear your ſelf, p. 359. [To prevent all ſuch Cavils we ſhall omit the Spinoſities of the Extenſion or Indiviſibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus: That the manifold Contradictions and Repugnancies we find in the nature of matter, to be able to either think or ſpontaneouſly to move itſelf, do well aſſure us that theſe operations belong not to it, but to ſome other ſubſtance: Wherefore we finding thoſe operations in us, it is manifeſt that we have in us an immaterial Being really diſtinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul: The ſpeculation of whoſe bare Eſſence, though it may well puzzle us, yet thoſe properties that we find incompetible to a Body, do ſufficiently inform us of the different Nature thereof: for it is plain ſhe is a Subſtance indued with the power of Cogitation, that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects, as alſo of penetrating and ſpontaneouſly moving of a Body; which properties are as immediate to her as impenetrability and ſeparability of parts to the matter, and we are not to demand the cauſe of the one any more than of the other.]

So here we have the true Form as ſufficient notice.

And if voluntary Motion be proper to a Spirit, I think meer Fire (Solar or Aethereal) is no Spirit; But if all ſelf-moving Power be proper to a Spirit, Fire is a Spirit. And from the Form will I denominate, while you oft tell us, that the Eſſence of Subſtance is unknown. (By Eſſence meaning ſomwhat elſe than that which I can fully prove to be the Form.

To conclude, there are theſe different Opinions before us.

I. That the whole Entity or Conceptus realis of a Spirit is Virtus vitalis, and is mera ſorma, or rather ſimplex actus Entitativus; and that ſubſtantia is added not as a partial real Conceptus, but as reſpective, to notifie that this Virtus vitalis is no Accident, but a thing that may ſubſiſt of itſelf. Some hold this true only of God, and ſome of all Spirits: If this be true, your notions of Penetrability and Indiviſibility are moſt eaſily defended.

II. That Spirits have two inadequate, real Conceptus, and that Subſtantia is the fundamental as truly as materia is in meer Bodies, and an incomprehenſible purity of Subſtance (or that it is Immaterial, not having partes extra partes with the trine dimenſion) is Subſtantiae diſpoſitio; (yet that this hath degrees as the Forms have, all Spirits not being of equal Purity;) And that Virtus vitalis is the partial Conceptus, viz. Formalis. And this I encline to, as to created Spirits.

III. That the Conceptus formalis of Spirit is this Virtus vitalis, vel motiva, perceptiva, appetitiva, but that all Matter is eſſentially informed by that Vitality, and ſo Matter and Vitality are the inadequate Conceptus of every Subſtance, and that not by Compoſition, but as of one ſimple thing. And this is Dr. Gliſſon's and ſome others.

IV. That a Spirit is both a real Subſtance, (as the fundamental Conceptus) and informed both by Immateriality, Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility, and alſo by a vital and moving Power: But that it exiſteth only in Bodies or Matter, and ſo always makes up a Compound of two Subſtances, (ſaving that God is infinite, beyond all Matter.) And that all ſuch Spirits were at firſt made together indiviſible Individuals, both that of the leaſt Creature and of the greateſt, but changed from Body to Body, and ſo are parts of Animals. This I ſuppoſe is your Opinion.

Our chief difference is, that I profeſs to be ignorant of the Conſiſtency and Incorporation which you talk of, and muſt be ſo: Though I am aſſured of the Subſtantiality and Form, which ſatisfieth me; for Chriſt knoweth all the reſt for me.

FINIS.

OF THE IMMORTALITY OF Mans Soul, And the Nature of it, and other Spirits.

Two Diſcourſes:

One in a Letter to an unknown Doubter; The other in a Reply to Dr▪ Henry Moore's Animadverſions on a private Letter to him; which he publiſhed in his Second Edition of Mr Joſeph Glanvil's Sadduciſmus Triumphatus, or Hiſtory of Apparitions

By RICHARD BAXTER.

LONDON: Printed for B. Simons, at the Three Golden Cocks at the Weſt End of St. Pauls. 1682.

The PREFACE.

§. 1. THE Author of the Letter which I anſwer, being wholly unknown to me, and making me no return of his ſenſe of my Anſwer, I ſuppoſe it can be no wrong to him that I publiſh it. I have formerly thought, that it is ſafer to keep ſuch Objections, and falſe reaſonings, from mens notice, than publickly to confute them. But now in London they are ſo commonly known, and publiſhed in open Diſcourſe and Writing, that whether ſilencing them be deſirable or not, it is become impoſſible. And tho I have ſaid ſo much more, eſpecially in two Books (The Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion, and the Unreaſonableneſs of Infidelity) as may make this needleſs to them that read thoſe; yet moſt Infidels and Sadduces being ſo ſelf conceited, and fastidious, as to diſdain, or caſt by all that will coſt them long reading and conſideration, it may be this ſhort Letter may ſo far prevail againſt their ſloth, as to invite them to read more. I would true Chriſtianity were as common as the profeſſion of it: There would then be fewer that need ſuch Diſcourſes. But alas! how numerous are th[•]ſe Chriſtians that are no Chriſtians, no more than a Carcaſs or a Picture is a man; yea, worſe Chriſtians, who hate Chriſtianity, whoſe Godfathers and Godmothers (not Parents, but Neighbours) did promiſe and vow three things in their Names. 1. That they ſhould renounce the Devil. and all his Works, the Pomps and Vanities of this wicked World, and all the ſinful luſts of the fleſh. 2. That they ſhould believe all the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith. 3. That they ſhould keep Gods holy Will and Commandments, and walk in the ſame all the days of their lives. Yea, before they could ſpeak, the mouth of theſe Godfathers ſpeaking for them, did not only promiſe, that they ſhould believe, but profeſs in the Infants name, That even then they did ſtedfaſtly believe the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith. The Infant is ſaid to make both the Promiſe and Profeſſion by theſe Godfathers; who alſo undertake to provide, that they ſhall [learn all things which a Chriſtian ought to know and believe to his Souls health, and ſhall be virtuouſly brought up, to lead a godly and a Chriſtian life]. Whether theſe Godfathers ever intend to perform this, or the Parents uſe to expect it of them, I need not tell you: But how little moſt of the baptized perform of it, is too notorious. And what wonder is it, if we have Chriſtians that in Satans Image fight againſt Chriſt, even PERJURED, MALIGNANT, PERSECUTING Chriſtians, haters of thoſe that ſeriouſly practice the baptiſmal Vow, when they are PERJURED and Perfidious Violaters of it themſelves, as to the prevalent bent of heart and life.

Theſe Hypocrite nominal Ceremony Chriſtians, become the great hinderance of the cure of Infidelity in the world. It is the SPIRIT by its ſupernatural Works, which is the great Witneſs of Chriſt, and the infallible proof of ſupernatural Revelation. Theſe witneſſing works of the Spirit, are theſe five: 1. His Antecedent Prophecies. 2. His inherent Divine impreſs on the Perſon, Works, and Goſpel of Chriſt. 3. His concomitant Teſtimony in Chriſts uncontrolled numerous Miracles, Reſurrection and Aſcenſion. 4. His ſubſequent Teſtimony in the numerous uncontrolled Miracles of the Apoſtles, and ſupernatural gifts to the Chriſtians of that Age. But tho the Hiſtory of theſe be as infallibly delivered to us, as any in the world; [〈◊〉] the diſtance hindereth the belief of ſome, who have not this hiſtory well opened to them. 5. Therefore God hath continued to the end of the world a more excellent Teſtimony than miracles (thought not ſo apt to work on ſenſe) even the ſpecial regenerating ſanctifying work of the Spirit of Chriſt, on the ſouls of all ſincere Believers: The raiſing of Souls to a Divine and Heavenly Diſpoſition, and Converſation, to live to God and the common good, in the comfortable hopes of an everlaſting heavenly glory, as purchaſed and given by our Redeemer, conquering the allurements of the world and fleſh, the temptations of Satan, and all the flatteries and frowns of the ungodly; This is a work that none but God can do and will do, which beareth his Image and ſuperſcription.

But now theſe Hypocrites, obſcure it to themſelves and other unbelievers, and tempt men to ſay, Are not Chriſtans as bad as Heathens? and Mahometans. Are they not as fleſhly, and worldly, and falſe, and perjured, and malicious, and hurtful, and pernicious to others and themſelves? But I anſwer, No, They are not: Theſe are no more Chriſtians, than Images are men: They are the Enemies of Chriſtians, that under Chriſts banner, and in his livery and name, do the moſt perfideouſly hate him and fight againſt him: Who will tell them, Inaſmuch as you did it to the leaſt of theſe, you did it to me. They betray him for money, as Judas, by Hail-maſter and a Kiſs. I challenge any Infidel to find me One that ſeriouſly believeth the Goſpel of Chriſt, as perceiving the certain Evidence of its truth, who is not a perſon of a holy and obedient heavenly life: How can a man ſincerely believe that God ſent his Son from Heaven in fleſh, to Redeem man, and to bring us to Glory, and that he ſealed his Doctrine by all his miracles, reſurrection and aſcenſi[•]n, and the Holy Ghoſt, and that he is our Head in Heaven, with whom we ſhall live in joy for ever; and is the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him, I ſay: How can a man believe this ſeriouſly, and not eſteem, and chooſe and ſeek it, before all the ſhadows and vanitie to this world. It is not Chriſtians, but falſe hypocrites, whoſe lives repreſent Chriſtianity, blaſphemouſly as no better than Heatheniſm or Mahometaniſm; It is but for worldly Intereſt, and Reputation, or becauſe it is the Religion of the King, Countrey, or Anceſtors, that they take up ſo much as the name and badg of Chriſtianity. And will you judg of our Religion by its enemies? Do you not ſee in their drunkenneſs, ſenſuality, covetouſneſs, ungodlineſs, how unlike their lives are to the baptiſmal Vow; and that they hate, and ſeek to deſtroy them that are ſerious in keeping that Vow, and living as Chriſtians?

§ 2. And as I publiſh this for the uſe of unbelievers, ſo I muſt let the Reader know, that it is become one of the uſual tricks of the Popiſh deceivers, to put on the Vizor of an Infidel, and to diſpute about the immortality of the Soul, and the greateſt difficulties of Religion: And it is to puzzle men, and convince them, that by Reaſoning they can never attain to ſatisfaction in theſe matters; And then to infer, [You have no way left, but to believe the Church; & we are that Church. If you leave that eaſie quiet way, you will never come to any certainty]. Why do they not try the ſame triek about all the difficulties in Philoſophy, Astronomy, Phyſick, Hiſtory, &c? For every S[••]ence, and Art, hath its difficulties. But are not all theſe as gaeat difficulties to the Pope and his Prelates, as they are to us? But God hath given us a more clear and ſatisfactory way of the ſolution of ſuch Doubts.

§. 3. I muſt further give notice to the Reader, That it was the publiſhing of Dr. H. More's anſwer to a Letter of mine, which occaſioned the publiſhing of this. When I was put on the one, I thought it not unprofitable to premiſe the other, as being of much greater uſe. It ſeemed good to the worthy Dr. to deſire my thoughts of his Deſcription of a Spirit, which he laid down in the firſt Edition of Mr. Glanvile of Apparitions: which I gave him in a haſty Letter, which he thought meet▪ without my knowledg, to publiſh an anſwer to, in his ſecond Edition of Mr. Glanvile. Our difference is ſcarce worth the Readers notice. And our velitation is only friendly, and Philoſophical. But yet it may poſſibly be uſeful to ſome at leaſt to excite them to a more profitable ſearch than I have made. And it explaineth ſome paſſages in my Methodus Theologiae.

But I much more commend to the reading of the Sadduces and Infidels, the Hiſtories themſelves of Apparitiins, and Watchcrafts, which Mr. Glanvile and Dr. More have there delivered; many of them, at leaſt, with undeniable evidence and proof. To which, if he will but add the Devil of Maſcon and Bodin, and Remigius of Witches; he will ſcarce be able to deny belief to the existence and Individuation of Spirits, and the future life of ſeparated Souls.

SIR,

I Have Reaſon to judg you no Stranger to ſuch Addreſſes as theſe: and therefore have adventured more boldly to apply my ſelf to you. Others would, it may be, rigedly cenſure this Attempt; but your more Chriſtian Temper will induce you, I hope, to judg more charitably, did you but underſtand with what reluctancy I undertook this task.

I have had many Diſputes with my ſelf, whether or no I ſhould ſtifle theſe Doubts, or ſeek Satisfaction. Shame to own ſuch Principles bid me do the firſt; but the weight of the Concern obliged me to the laſt. For I could not with any chearfulneſs, or with that vigor I thought did become me, purſue thoſe unſeen Subſtances, thoſe Objects of Faith Religion holds forth, except I did really believe their exiſtence, and my own capacity of enjoyning them.

I thought at firſt to ſatisfie my ſelf in the certainty of the things I did believe; to confirm and eſtabliſh my Faith by theſe Studies, that I might be able to render a Reaſon of the hope that is in me: but inſtead of building up, I am ſhaken; and inſtead of a clearer evidence, I am invironed with uncertainties.

Unhappy that I am! I had better have taken all upon Truſt, could I ſo have ſatisfied my Reaſon, than thus to have involved my ſelf in an endleſs Study. For ſuch I am afraid it will prove without help: for that I may not in this Concern reſt without ſatisfaction; and yet the more I conſider, and weigh things, the more are my doubts multiplied. I call them only doubts, not to palliate any opinions; for I have not yet eſpouſed any; but becauſe they have not yet attained ſo much maturity or ſtrength, as to take me off thoſe things, my doubts being ſatisfied, I ſhould conclude of indiſpenſable neceſſity; they are but yet in the Womb: aſſiſt to make them Abortives.

I have not been wanting to my ſelf, but in the uſe of all means to me known, have ſought ſatisfaction, both by Prayer, Reading, and Meditation. I have weighed and conſulted things according to my Capacity. I have been as faithful to my ſelf in all my reaſonings, as I could, and void of prejudice, have paſſed impartial Cenſures on the things in debate, ſo far as that light I have would enable me; and what to do more, I know not, except this courſe I now take, prove effectual, you inclining to aſſiſt me, that I know have ſtudied theſe things.

My requeſt to you therefore is, If your more publick Studies will permit you, That you would condeſcend to ſatisfie me in the Particulars I ſhall mention. I aſſure you, I have no other deſign, but to know the Truth: which in things of ſuch moment, certainly cannot be difficult, tho to my unfurniſhed Head they have proved ſo: I hope my ſhaking may prove my eſtabliſhment.

That I may therefore put you to as little trouble as I can, I will firſt tell you what I do believe, and then what I ſtick at.

Firſt, therefore, I do really believe, and am very well ſatisfied, That there is a God, or a firſt Cauſe that hath created all things, and given to every thing its Being. For I am not acquainted with any independent Being. I know not any thing that is able to ſubſiſt without the Contribution of its Fellow-Creatures. I am conſcio[•]s to my ſelf, when ſickneſs invades me, and death ſummons my Compound to a diſſolution, I can do nothing to the preſervation of the Being I enjoy. And if I cannot preſerve my ſelf as I am, much leſs could I make my ſelf what I am: For when I was nothing, I could do nothing. And Experience and Senſe tells me, As it is with me, ſo it is with others; as there is none can preſerve their Beings, ſo there is none could acquire to themſelves the Being they have; and if none, then not the firſt man. And indeed that was it I enquired after, from whence every ſpecies had at firſt their Beings; the way, how, and means by which they are continued. I know not any Cauſe of the Being of any thing, of which again I may not enquire the Cauſe: and ſo from Cauſe to Cauſe, till through a multitude of Cauſes, I neceſſarily arrive at the firſt Cauſe of all Cauſes, a Being wholly uncauſed, and without Cauſe, except what it was unto it ſelf.

My next Enquiry was into my ſelf; and my next buſineſs, to find what Concern I have with my Creator: which I knew no better way to attain, than by ſearching the bounds of humane Capacity. For I concluded it reaſonable to judg thoſe attainments I was capable of in my Creation, I was deſigned for. Now if man is nothing more than what is viſible, or may be made ſo by Anatomy or Pharmacy, he is no Subject capable of enjoying, or loving God, nor conſequently of a life of Retrobution.

In this Enquiry I found Man conſiſted of ſomething viſible and inviſible; the Body which is viſible, and ſomething elſe that inviſibly actuates the ſame. For I have ſeen the Body, the viſible part of man; when the inviſible, either through indiſpoſition of its Orgains, or its ſelf, or being expelled its Manſion, hath ceaſed to act (I ſpeak as one in doubt): the Body hath been left to outward appearance the ſame; it was yet really void of Senſe, and wholly debilitated of all power to act: But then what this inviſible is, what to conclude of it, I know not: Here I am at a ſtand, and in a Labyrinth, without a Clue: For I find no help any where. Many have, I acknowledg, defended the Souls Immortality; but none have proved the exiſtence of ſuch a Being, and a life of Retrobution,^[1] and that copiouſly enough; but none have proved a Subject capable of it. I know all our Superior Faculties and Actings, are uſually attributed to the Soul; but what it is in man they call ſo, they tell us not. To ſay it is that by which I reaſon, or that now dictates to me what I write, is not ſatisfactory: For I look for a definition, and ſuch an one, as may not to ought elſe be appropriated. Is it therefore a real Being, really different from the Body, and able to be without it? or is it not? If not, whatever it be, I matter not. If it be, is it a pure Spirit, or meerly material? If meerly material, and different only from the Body gradually, and in ſome few degrees of ſubtilty, it is then a queſtion, whether or not that we call Death, and ſuppoſe a ſeparation of the Compound, be not rather a Concentration of this active Principle in its own Body, which through ſome indiſpoſition of the whole, or ſtoppage in its Orgains, through groſs Corporeity, hath ſuffocated its actings. If it be a pure Spirit, I would then know, what is meant by Spirit? and whether or no all things inviſible, and imperceptable to Senſe, are accounted ſuch? If ſo, it is then only a term to diſtinguiſh between things evident to Senſe, and things not. If otherwiſe, how ſhall I diſtinguiſh between the higheſt degree of material, and the loweſt degree of ſpiritual Beings, or know how they are diverſified, or be certain the Being of the Soul is rightly appropriated. For to me, an immaterial and ſpiritual Being, ſeems but a kind of Hocus, and a Subſtance ſtript of all materiality, a ſubſtantial nothing. For all things at firſt had their Origine from the deep dark Waters: witneſs Moſes Philoſophy, in the 1ſt of Geneſis, on which the Spirit of God is ſaid to move. I am far from believing thoſe Waters ſuch as that Element we daily make uſe of; but that they were material, appears by thoſe multitudes of material Productions they brought forth. And if thoſe Waters were material, ſuch were all things they d[•]d produce, among which was Man, of whom the Text aſſerts nothing more plain; for it ſaith, God created man of the duſt of the earth; the moſt groſs part and ſedement of thoſe Waters, after all things elſe were created. Now the Body only is not Man; for Man is a living Creature: it is that therefore by which the Body lives and acts, that conſtitutes the Man. Now the Apoſtle mentioneth Man to conſiſt of Body, Soul and Spirit. My Argument then is this, God created man of the duſt of the earth.

But Man conſiſts of a Body Soul and Spirit:

Therefore Body, Soul and Spirit are made of the duſt, &c. and are material.

The major and minor are undeniable; and therefore the concluſion. Yet do I not therefore conclude its annihilation: for I know all matter is eternal; but am rather perſwaded of its concentration (as afore) in its own body.

But of its real Being, purely ſpiritual, and ſtript of all materiality, really diſtinct from its body, I doubt.

Becauſe that by ſeveral accidents happening to the body, the man is incapacited from acting rationally, as before; as in thoſe we call Ideots, there is not in ſome of them ſo much a ſign of a reaſonable Soul, as to diſtinguiſh them from Bruits: Whereas were the Soul ſuch as repreſented, it would rather ceaſe to act, than act at a rate below it ſelf. Did it know its Excellencies, ſuch as we make them, it would as ſoon deſert its being, as degrade its ſelf by ſuch bruitiſh acts: It is not any defect in its Organs could rob the Soul of its Reaſon, its Eſſential Faculty. Tho the Workman breaks his Tools, his hands do not loſe their skill, but ceaſeth to act, rather than to do ought irregularly: ſo likewiſe would the Soul then act contrary to its own nature.

Secondly, Becauſe all the ſpecies both of the Mineral, Vegitable, and Animal Kingdoms, appear to me, but as the more eminent Works of a moſt excellent Operator, as Engines of the moſt accurate Engineer; they all live, and have a Principle of Life manifeſt in their growth and augmentation, and ſo far as they are living weights, as I can perceive from the ſame ſource. But then comes in thoſe Natures and Faculties whereby each is diſtinguiſhed from other, even like ſeveral pieces of Clock, or Watch-work: the one ſhews the hour of the day, and no more; the next ſhews the hour and minutes, another ſhews both the former, and likewiſe the Age of the Moon; another hath not only the three former motions, but an addition of the riſe and fall of Tides; yet all this, and many more that in that way are performed, are ſeveral diſtinct motions, ariſing all from the ſame Cauſe, the Spring or Weight, the Principle of motion in them. So among living Weights, the firſt do only grow and augment their bulk, and have no poſſibility in nature to augment their kind; the next, to wit, Vegitables, do not only grow and increaſe their bulk, but likewiſe have a power of propagating their like: the third Family, I mean the Animal Kingdom, do not only live and encreaſe their kind, but likewiſe are made ſenſative. And laſtly, we our ſelves that are not only poſſeſt of all the former, but of ſomething, I know not what, we think more excellent, and call Reaſon, and all this from the ſame ſource; namely, that we live; which if we did not, we could not perform any of theſe acts. For life in us is the ſame as the Spring or Weight in the Watch or Clock, which ceaſing, all other motion ceaſeth, as in a Watch or Clock, the Spring or Weight being down.

As Life therefore is the Cauſe of all Motion, and all natural Operation and Faculties; yet thoſe multifarious Operations and Faculties, manifeſt in, and proper to the particular ſpecies of the Three Kingdoms, requires not divers Principles of Life, no more than divers motions ſpecified in a Watch or Clock, requires divers Weights or Springs. And as the diverſity of motion in Watch or Clock, ariſeth not from diverſity of Weights or Springs, but rather from other means: ſo thoſe diverſities of Natures and Faculties, manifeſt throughout the Three Kingdoms, ariſe not from divers Principles of Life, but from one Principle of Life, manifeſting its power in Bodies diverſly organized. So that a Tree or Herb that only vegitates and propagates its kind, hath no other Principle of Life than an Animal that hath Senſe, and more eminent Faculties. The difference only, as I conceive, is, this Principle of Life in the vegitable, is bound up in a Body organized to no other eud, by which Life is hindred exerting any other power: but in the Animal it's kindled in a purer matter, by which it's capacitated to frame more excellent Orgains, in order to the exerting more eminent Acts. For the Principle of Life can no more act rationally in matter capable of naught but vegitation (for it acts in matter according to the nature thereof, advancing it to its utmoſt excellency), than a man can ſaw with a Coult-Staff, or file with an Hatcher, or make a Watch with a Betle and Wedges.

I am apt to believe thoſe rare Endowments, and eminent Faculties, wherewith men ſeem to excel meer Senſatives, are only the improvement of Speech, wherein we have the advantage of them, and the reſult of reiterated Acts, until they become habits. For by the firſt we are able to communicate our Conceptions and Experiments each to other; and by the other we do gradually aſcend to the knowledg of things. For is all the knowledg either in the acts, Liberal or Mechanical, any more than this acts reiterated, until they become habits; which when they are, we are ſaid to know them? And what is all our reaſoning, but an Argument in Diſcourſe toſſed from one to another, till the Truth be found, like a Ball between two Rackets, till at laſt a lucky blow puts an end to the ſport? We come into the World hardly men; and many whoſe natures want cultivation, live, having nothing to diſtinguiſh them from Brutes, but the outward form, ſpeech, and ſome little dexterity, ſuch as in Apes or Monkeys, in the things they have been taught, and the Affairs they have been bred to. And could we imagine any man to have lived Twenty or Thirty years in the World, without the benefit of Humane Converſe, What would appear then, think you, of a rational Soul? which the wiſe man well ſaw when he aſſerted the Condition of Men and Beaſts to be the ſame what a meer Ignorant hath; Moſes himſelf made of Adam, that in his ſuppoſed beſt ſtate, knew not that he was naked: but I believe the Nine Hundred and Thirty years Experience of his own, and the continual Experiments of Poſterity, in that time communicated to him, might quicken his Intellect. So that he died with more Reaſon than he was created, and humane nature in his poſterity. The next Generation was imbelliſhed with his attainments, to which their own Experiences ſtill made a new addition. The next Generation built on their Foundation, and the next on their; and ſo on: and we are got on the ſhoulders of them all. So that it's rather a wonder, that we know no more, than that we know ſo much. So that what we have, ſeems rather times product, through the means aforeſaid, than what our Natures were at firſt enricht with.

The which appears likewiſe in thoſe whoſe memory fails, and in whom the veſtigia of things is wore out; the habits they had contracted, and manner of working in their ſeveral acts being forgotten, what ſilly Animals are they? Whereas were the Soul ſuch as repreſented, who could rob it of its Endowments? It's true the debilitating of a hand, may impead a manual labour; but raſe what hath formerly been done out of the Memory, and you render Man a perfect Bruit, or worſe: for he knows not how to give a ſignification of his own mind.

And indeed, I know not any thing wherein Man excels the Beaſts, but may be referred to the benefit of Speech and Hands, capable of effecting its Conceptions; nor find any better way to attain a right knowledg of our ſelves, but by beholding our ſelves in Adam, and enquiring, what Nature had endued him with, which will fall far ſhort of what we now admire in our ſelves.

But now ſuppoſing all this anſwer'd, what will it avail us to a Life of Retrobution, if all return to one Element, and be there immerged as Brooks and Rivers in the Sea? If we loſe our Individuation; and all the Souls that have exiſted, be ſwallowed up of one, where are the Rewards and Puniſhments of each individual. And we have reaſon to judg it will be thus, rather than otherwiſe, becauſe we ſee every thing tends to its own Centre, the Water to the Sea, and all that was of the Earth to the Earth, from whence they were taken. And Solomon ſaith, The ſpirit returns to God that gave it. Every thing then returning to its own Element, Ioſeth its Individuation. For we ſee all bodies returning to the earth, are no more individual bodies, but earth: Have we not reaſon then to judg the ſame of Spirits returning to their own Element? And what happineſs then can we hope for, more than a deliverance from the preſent calamity? or what miſery are we eapable of, more than what is common to all?

The ſame is more evident in the body with which we converſe, and are more ſenſibly acquainted with, ſeems wholly uncapable of either, &c. For all bodies are material, and matter it ſelf is not capable of multiplication, but of being changed. Therefore Nature cannot multiply bodies, but changeth them; as ſome bodies ariſe, others periſh. Natures expence in continual Productions being conſtantly ſupplied by the diſſolution of other Compounds: were it otherwiſe, her Store-houſe would be exhauſted; for its by continual Circulations, Heaven and Earth is maintain'd; and by her even Circular motion, ſhe keeps her ſelf imployed on the ſame ſtock of matter, and maintains every ſpecies. There is no body the ſame to day it was yeſterday, matter being in a continual flux; neither immediately on the diſſolution of a Compound, and Corruption of the body, doth the earth thereof retain any ſpecifick difference of that body it once was, but is immediately beſtowed by Nature, and ordered to the new production of other things. That part of matter therefore which conſtituteth a humane body, in a ſhort time is putrified, and made earth, which again produceth either other inferior Animals, or Graſs, or Corn, for the nouriſhment of Beaſts and Fowl, which again are the nouriſhment of men. Thus circularly innumerable times round, Nature continually impreſſing new forms of the ſame matter. So that that matter that now conſtitutes my body, it may be a thouſand years ago was the matter of ſome other mans, or it may be of divers mens, then putrified; which in this time hath ſuffered infinite changes, as it may be ſometime Graſs, or Corn, or an Herb, or Bird, or Beaſt, or divers of them, or all, and that divers times over, before my body was framed; who then can ſay, why this matter ſo changeable, ſhould at laſt be reſtored, my body rather than his, whoſe formerly it was, or the body of a Bird, or other Animal? For by the ſame Reaſons that the body of man is proved to ariſe again, may, I think, be proved the Reſtoration of all other bodies, which is equally incredible to me (if underſtood at one time). For Natures ſtock of matter being all at firſt exhauſted, ſhe could not employ her ſelf in new Productions, without deſtroying ſome of the old; much leſs can ſhe at once fabricate out of the ſame quantity of matter, all the bodies that ever were, are, or ſhall be; which yet, notwithſtanding could ſhe, they could not be ſaid to be the ſame bodies, becauſe all bodies ſuffer ſuch alteration daily, that they cannot be ſaid to be the ſame to day they were yeſterday; how then can they be capable of Reward or Puniſhment?

Theſe are now my doubts; but are they the fruits of Diligence? and am I thus rewarded for not believing at a common rate? A great deal cheaper could I have ſate down, and believed as the Church believes; without a why, or a wherefore, have been ignorant of theſe Diſputes, and never have emerged my ſelf in this gulf, than thus by Reflection to create my own diſturbance. Had I been made a meer Animal, I had had none of theſe Doubts nor Fears that thus torment my mind; for doubting, happy Bruits happy, far more happy than my ſelf! With you is none of this; with you only is ſerenity of mind, and you only void of Anxieties; you only enjoy what this world is able to accommodate with, and it may be too have thoſe Careſſes we know not of, while we, your poor purveyors, go drooping and diſponding, doubting, fearing, and caring about, and our whole lives only a preying on one another, and tormenting our ſelves. You have the carnal content and ſatisfaction; we nothing but the ſhell, a vain glorious boaſt of our Lordſhip over you, with which we ſeek to ſatisfie our ſelves, as Prodigals, with husks, while the truth is, we are afraid to confront our Vaſſals, except we firſt by craft and treachery beguile them from whom likewiſe we flee, if once enraged: and what a poor comfort is this? Is this a Priviledg to boaſt of? Is this all Reaſon advanceth to, only a Purveyor to Beaſts, and to make my life more miſerable, by how much more ſenſible of miſery! Well might Solomon prefer the dead before the living; and thoſe that had not been, before both; intimating thereby, that being beſt, leaſt capable of miſery; that is, of Trees, of Herbs, of Stones, and all inanimates, which wanting ſenſe, are inſenſible of miſery. Better any thing than man therefore, ſince that every brute and inanimate ſtock or ſtone, are more happy in that meaſure: they are leſs capable of miſery. What the advantage then, what the benefit that occurs to us from them, or what preheminence have we above them, ſeeing as dieth the one, ſo dieth the other, and that they have all one breath?

Pardon this Degreſſion; the real ſenſe and apprehenſion I have of things, extort it from me. For I, as Job, cannot refrain my mouth, but ſpeak in the bitterneſs of my Spirit, and complain in the anguiſh of my Soul, Why died I not from the womb? why did I not give up the ghoſt when I came out of the belly? Why did the knees prevent me? or why the breaſts, that I ſhould ſuck? I had then been among Solomon's happy ones: I ſhould now have lain ſtill and been quiet; I ſhould have ſlept, and been at reſt: whereas now I am weary of life. For tho I ſpeak, my grief is not aſſwaged; and tho I forbear, I am not eaſed; but now he hath made me weary, and made deſolate all my company: he hath filled me with wrinkles, which is a witneſs againſt me; and my leanneſs riſing up in me, beareth witneſs to my face, God hath delivered me to the ungodly, and turned me over into the hand of the wicked, and my familiar friends have forgotten me. I ſaid, I ſhall die in my neſt, and ſhall multiply my days as the ſand, when my root was ſpread out by the waters, and the dew lay all night on my branch; when my glory was freſh, and my bow was renewed in my hand: but I find while my fleſh is upon me, I ſhall have pain, and while my ſoul is in me, it ſhall mourn. Have pity upon me, O my friend! for the hand of God hath touched me. The wicked live, and become old; yea, they are mighty in power, their ſeed is eſtabliſhed in their ſight with them, and their off-ſpring before their eyes; their houſes are ſafe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them, &c. they are planted, and take root, they grew; yea, they bring forth fruit, yet God is never in their mouth, and far from their reins. In vain then do I waſh my hands in innocency, ſeeing all things come alike to all. There is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good, to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that ſacrificeth, and to him that ſacrificeth not: as is the good, ſo is the ſinner; and he that ſweareth, as he that feareth an oath.

I have now done (tho I hardly know how), leſt I too far trouble you; and only beg your peruſal of theſe lines, and two or three in anſwer of them by this Bearer, who ſhall at your appointment wait on you for the ſame. Let me farther [•]eg theſe two things of you: firſt, That you would conſider you have not to do with a Sophiſtick Wrangler, or with one that would willingly err, but with one that deſires to know the Truth. Let therefore your Anſwer be, as much as you can, void of Scholaſtick Terms, or Notions that may lead me more into the dark. And then, as Job did beg, That God would withdraw his hand far from him, and that his dread might not make him afraid; ſo I. And further, That you would not awe me with his greatneſs, nor ſuppreſs my Arguments with his Omnipotence. Then call thou, and I will anſwer; or let me ſpeak, and anſwer thou me. Thus begging the Divine Influence to direct you, and enlighten me, I ſubſcribe my ſelf,

SIR,

§. 1. IT is your wiſdom in Caſes of ſo great moment, to uſe all juſt endeavours for ſatisfaction; and I think you did but your duty, to ſtudy this as hard as you ſay you have done. But 1. I wiſh you had ſtudied it better; for then you would not have been a ſtranger to many Books which afford a juſt ſolution of your Doubts, as I muſt ſuppoſe you are, by your taking no notice of what they have ſaid. 2. And I wiſh you had known, that between the ſolving of all your Objections, and taking all on Truſt from men, or believing as the Church believeth, there are Two other ways to ſatisfaction (which muſt be conjunct): 1. Diſcerning the unanſwerable evidences in Nature and Providence, of the Souls future Life. 2. And taking it on truſt from Divine Revelation; which is otherwiſe to be proved, than by believing as the Church by Authority requireth you.

I have written on this Subject ſo much [••]ready, that I had rather you had told me, why you think it unſatisfactory, than deſire me to tranſcribe it, while Print is as legible as Manuſcript. If you have not read it, I humbly offer it to your conſideration. It is moſt in two Books: The firſt which I intreat you to read, is called, The Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion: the other is called, The Unreaſonableneſs of Infidelity. If you think this too much labour, you are not ſo hard or faithful a Student of this weighty Caſe, as it deſerveth, and you pretend to be. If you will read them (or the firſt at leaſt), and after come to me, that we may fairly debate your remaining Doubts, it will be a likelier way for us to be uſeful to each other, than my going over all the miſtakes of your Paper will be. And I ſuppoſe you know, that we have full aſſurance of a multitude of Verities, againſt which many Objections may be raiſed, which no mortal man can fully ſolve, eſpecially from Modes and Accidents. Nay, perhaps there is nothing in the World which is not liable to ſome ſuch Objections. And yet I will not neglect, your writing.

§. 2. When you were convinc'd, That there is a firſt Cauſe, it would have been an orderly progreſs to think what that Cauſe is; and whether his Works do not prove his Infinite Perfection, having all that eminently which he giveth formally to the whole World, as far as it belongeth to perfection to have it. For none can give more than he hath. And then you ſhould have thought what this God is to man, as manifeſt in his Works: and you ſhould have conſidered what of man is paſt doubt, and thence in what relation he ſtands to God, and to his fellow-creatures: And this would have led you to know mans certain duty: and that would have aſſured you of a future life of Retribution. Is not this a juſt progreſs?

§. 3. But you would know a Definition of the Soul. But do you know nothing but by Definitions? Are all men that cannot define, therefore void of all knowledg? You know not at all what ſeeing is, or what light is, or what feeling, ſmelling, taſting, hearing is, what ſound or odor is, what ſweet or bitter, nor what thinking, or knowing, or willing, or loving is, if you know it not before defining tell you, and better than bare defining can ever tell you. Every vital faculty hath a ſelf-perception in its acting; which is an eminent ſenſe: Intuition alſo of outward ſenſible Objects, or immediate perception of them, as ſenſata & imaginata, is before all Argument and Definition, or reaſoning action. By ſeeing, we perceive that we ſee; and by underſtanding, we perceive that we underſtand. I dare ſay, That you know the Acts of your own Soul by acting, tho when you come to reaſoning or defining, you ſay you know not what they are. You can give no definition what ſubſtance is, or Ens at leaſt, much leſs what God is. And yet what is more certain than that there is Subſtance, Entity, and God?

§. 4. But I'le tell you what the Soul of m[•]n is: It is a Vital, Intellectual, Volitive Spirit, animating a humane organized Body. When it is ſeparated, it is not formally a Soul, but a Spirit ſtill.

§. 5. Qu. But what is ſuch a mental Spirit? It is a moſt pure Subſtance, whoſe form is a Power or Virtue of Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition (three in one).

§. 6. I. Are you not certain of all theſe Acts, viz. That you Act vitall, underſtand and will? If not, you are not ſure that you ſee, that you doubt, that you wrote to me, or that you are any thing.

II. If you act theſe, it is certain that you have the power of ſo acting. For nothing doth that which it cannot do.

III. It is certain, that it is a Subſtance which hath this power: For nothing can do nothing.

IV. It is evident, that it is not the viſible Body, as compoſed of Earth, Water and Air, which is this mental Subſtance. Neither any one of them, nor all together have Life, Underſtanding, or Will. They are paſſive Beings, and act not at all of themſelves, but as acted by inviſible Powers. They have an aggregative inclination to U[•]ion, and no other. Were it not for the Igneous Nature which is active, or for Spirits, they would be ceſſant. Therefore you are thus far paſt the dark, That there is in man an Inviſible Subſtance, which hath, yea, which is a Power or Virtue of Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition.

V. And that this Active Power is a diſtinct thing from meer Paſſive Power, or mobilitie per aliud, Experience puts paſt doubt. There is in every living thing a Power, or Virtue of ſelf-moving, elſe Life were not Life.

VI. And that this is not a meer accident of the Soul, but its eſſential form, I have proved ſo fully in my Methodus Theologiae, in a peculiar Diſputation, that I will not here repeat it. It's evident, That even in the igneous Subſtance, the Vis Motiva, Illuminativa, Calefactiva, is more than an accident, even its eſſential form: But were it otherwiſe, it would but follow, That if the very accidental Acts or qualities of a Soul be ſo noble, its eſſential muſt be greater.

VII. But it is certain, That neither Souls, nor any thing, have either Being, Power, or Action, but in conſtant receptive dependence on the continued emanation of the prime Cauſe; and ſo no Inviduation is a total ſeparation from him, or an Independence, or a ſelf-ſufficiency. Thus far natural light tells you what Souls are.

§. 7. You add you ſelf, That thoſe attainments which you were made capable of, you were deſigned to. Very right. God maketh not ſuch noble Faculties or Capacities in vain; much leſs to engage all men to a life of duty, which ſhall prove deceit and miſery. But you have Faculties capable of thinking of God, as your Beginning, Guide, and End, as your Maker, Ruler, and Benefactor; and of ſtudying your duty to him, in hope of Reward, and of thinking what will become of you after Death, and of hoping for future Bleſſedneſs, and fearing future Miſery: all which no Bruit was ever capable of. Therefore God deſigned you to ſuch ends which you are thus capable of.

§. 8. You ſay (p. 3.) Many have defended the Souls Immortality; but none have proved a Subject capable of a life of Retribution. It's a Contradiction to be immortal, or rewarded, and not to be a Subject capable. For nothing hath no accidents. Nothing hath that which it is not capable of haing.

§. 9. You ſay, None tell us what it is. How many Score Volumes have told it us? I have now briefly told you what it is. You ſay, [To ſay it is that by which I reaſon, is not ſatisfactory. I look for a Definition]. But on Condition you look not to ſee or feel it, as you do Trees or Stones, you may be ſatisfied. I have given you a Definition. The Genus is Subſtantia puriſſima; the Differentia is Virtus Vitalis, Activa, Intellectiva, Volitiva (trinum a Imago Creatoris). What's here wanting to a Definition?

I have told you, That there is an antecedent more certain Perception, than by Definition; by which I know that I ſee, hear, taſte, am, and by which the Soul, in act, is conſcious of it ſelf.

§. 10. You ask, 1. Is it a real Being? Anſw. I told you, Nothing can do nothing.

2. Is it really different from the Body? Anſw. A Subſtance which hath in it ſelf an Eſſential Principle of Life, Intellection, and Volition, and that which hath not, are really different. Try whether you can make a Body feel, or underſtand without a Soul. 2. Thoſe that are ſeperable, are really different.

3. You ask, Is it able to be without it? Anſw. What ſhould hinder it? The Body made not the Soul: A viler Subſtance giveth not being to a nobler. 2. Nothing at all can be without continued Divine ſuſtentation. But we ſee, Juxta naturam, God annihilateth no Subſtance: Changes are but by compoſition, and ſeparation, and action, but not by annihilation. An Atome of Earth or Water, is not annihilated; and why ſhould we ſuſpect, that a Spiritual Subſtance is? Yea, the contrary is fully evident, tho God is able to annihilate all things.

§. 11. You ſay, If it be meerly material, and differ from the Body but gradually, Death may be but its concentration of this active Principle in its own Body.

Anſw. If you underſtand your own words, it's well. 1. Do you know what material ſignifieth? See Crakenthorp's Metaphyſicks, and he will tell you in part, it's an ambiguous word. Sometime it ſignifieth the ſame as ſubſtantia; and ſo Souls are material. Sometime it ſignifieth only that ſort of Subſtance which is called corporeal. Dr. More tells you, That Penetrability, and Indiviſibility, difference them.

But what if fire ſhould differ from air materially, but in degree of ſubtilty and purity, or ſenſitive Souls from igneous, and mental from ſenſitive, but in higher degrees of purity of matter; Is it not the form that maketh the ſpecifick difference? Air hath not the igneous Virtue of Motion, [••]umination, and Calefaction; nor ig[••]s, the ſenſitive Virtues, nor meer ſenſi[••]ves the rational Virtues aforeſaid. For[••] dat eſſe & nomen. This maketh not [•]meer gradual difference, but a ſpeci[••].

There is in Compounds matter, and materiae diſpoſitio receptiva, & forma. There is ſomewhat anſwerable [〈◊〉] ſpiritual uncompounded Beings. There is ſubſtantia, and ſubſtantiae diſpoſitio, & forma. Theſe are but intellectually distinct, and not [〈◊〉], and are but inadequate conceptions of one thing. That ſubstantia is conceptus fundamentalis, is confeſt. Some make penetr[••]bility and indiviſibility, ſubstantiae concep[•••] diſpoſiti[••]. But the Virtus vitalis activa, intol[•] [〈◊〉], volitiva, in one, is the conceptus formatis.

2. But what mean you by [the active Principles concentration in its own body]? It is a ſtrange Fxpreſſion. 1. If you mean, that it's annihilated, then it remaineth not. [〈◊〉] If you mean, that it remaineth an active Principle, you mean a ſubstance, or acci[•••]t. If [〈◊〉] ſubstance, it ſeems you acknow[•••]g it a ſelf-ſubſiſting being, only not ſeparate from its carcaſs. And if they be two, why are they not ſeparable? If ſeparable, why not ſeparated? When the duſt of the Carcaſs is ſcattered, is the Soul concentred in every atome, or but in one? And is it many, or one concentred Soul? If you mean, That it's but an accident, that's diſprov'd before; what accident is it? If con[••]ntred in the body, the body, and every duſt of it, is vital and intellectual. And if ſo, every clod and ſtone is ſo; which I will not ſo much wrong you, as to imagine that you think.

§. 12. But you would know what's meant by a ſpirit, whether all that is not evident to ſenſe? Anſ. It is a pure ſubſtance (ſaith Dr. More, penetrable and indiviſible) eſſentially vital, perceptive and appetitive.

§. 13. You add, [How ſhall I know the difference between the higheſt degree of materials, and lowest of immaterials? To me an immaterial, and ſpiritual being, ſeems a kind of Hccus, a ſubſtantial nothing.

Anſ. If you take matter for the ſame with ſubstance, it is material. But not if you take matter, as it's uſually taken, for corporeal; or groſs, and impenetrable, and diviſible ſubstance, uncapable of eſſential, vital, ſelfmoving perception and appetite. If this ſeems nothing to you, God ſeems nothing to you, and true Nature, which is Principium motus, ſeems nothing to you: And all that performeth all the action which you ſee in the world; ſeems nothing to you. It's pity that you have converſt ſo little with God and your ſelf, as to think both to be nothing.

§. 14. What you ſay out of Gen. 1. is little elſe but miſtake, when you ſay [all was made out of the deep waters by the ſpirit of God]. The Text nameth what was made of them. It ſaith nothing of the Creation of Angels, or Spirits, out of them (no, nor of the Light, or Earth, or Firmament).

And whereas you ſay, [God made man of the duſt of the ground; but the body only is not man, ergo. Anſ. You uſe your ſelf too unkindly, to leave out half the words, Gen. 2. 7. And the Lord God formed man of the duſt of the ground, and breathed into his noſtrils the breath of life, and man became a living ſoul; when the Text tells us the two works by which God made man, will you leave out one, and then argue excluſively againſt it? What if I ſaid, [The Chandler made a Candle of Tallow, and then by another kindled it]? or [a man made an houſe of Bricks, and cemented them with Mortar, &c.]? will you thence prove, That he made a Candle burning without fire, or the Houſe without Mortar? Words are uſeleſs to ſuch Expoſitors.

§. 15. Page 4. you ſay; You know all matter is eternal.

But you know no ſuch thing. If it be Eternal, it hath one Divine perfection: and if ſo, it muſt have the reſt, and ſo ſhould be God. But what's your proof?

You again (believe the Souls concentration in its body]▪ Anſ. Words inſignificant. It's Idem or Aliud. If Idem, then duſt is Eſſentially Vital and Intellectual. Deny not ſpiritual forms, if every clod or ſtone have them. If Aliud, how prove you it to be there, rather than elſewhere? And if you conſidered well, you would not believe eſſential, ſubstantial life and mind, to lye dead and unactive, ſo long as the duſt is ſo.

§. 16. You come to the hardeſt Objecti- [The Souls defective acting in infants, ideots, the ſick, &c. and ſay, [It would rather not act, if it were as repreſented.]

Anſ. 1. It cannot be denied, but the Operations of the Soul here, are much of them upon the organized body; and tho not organical, as if they acted by an Organ, yet organical, as acting on an Organ; which is the material Spirit▪ primarily. And ſo there go various Cauſes to ſome Effects, called Acts.

2. And the Soul doth nothing independently, but as dependent on God, in Being and Operation: and therefore doth what God knoweth, and uſeth it too, as his Inſtrument, in the forming of the body; and in what it knoweth not it ſelf. And as God, as fons naturae neceſſitateth the natural agency of the Soul, as he doth the Soul of Bruits. But as the wiſe and free Governor of the world, he hath to moral acts, given mans Soul free-will, and therefore conducting Reaſon; which it needs not to neceſſitated acts, as digeſtion, motion of the blood, formation of the body, &c.

And as it is not made to do all its acts freely and rationally, ſo neither at all times, as in Apoplexies, Infancy, Sleep, &c. It is eſſential to the Soul, to have the active power or virtue of Intellection and Free-will, but not always to uſe it. As it is eſſential to the ſubſtance of fire, tho latent in a flint, to have the power of motion, lighe and heat.

And its conſiderable, that as a traveller in his journey, thinking and talking only of other things, retaineth ſtill a ſecret act of intending his end, (elſe he would not go on) when he perceiveth and obſerveth it not at all. He that playeth on the Lute or Harpſical, ceaſeth when his Inſtrument is, out of tune; becauſe he acteth by free-will.

But the Soul of an Idiot or mad-man acteth only per modum naturae, not by free-acts, but neceſſitated by God by the order of nature. Only moral acts are free; and that ſome other are but brutiſh, and ſome but vegitative, is no-more a wonder, than that it ſhould underſtand in the head, and be ſenſible only in the moſt of the body, and vegitative only in the hairs and nails. It operateth in all the body by the Spirits, as calid; but about the eyes, and open ſenſoria, by Spirits alſo as lucid, for that uſe.

§. 14. But never forget this, That nothing at any time doth what it cannot do: but many can do that which they do not. Tho the Soul in the Womb, or Sleep, remember not, or reaſon not; if ever it do it, that proveth it had the power of doiug it. And that power is not a novel accident, tho the act may be ſo.

§. 18. To your Explications p. 4. I ſay, 1. None doubts, but all the world is the work of one prime operating Cauſe; Whom I hope you ſee in them, is of perfect power, wiſdom aud goodneſs, the chief efficient dirigent and final cauſe of all.

2. I doubt not, but the created univerſe is all one thing or frame; and no one atome or part totally ſeparated from, and independent on the reſt.

3. But yet the parts are multitudes, and heterogeneous, and have their Individuation, and are at once many and one in ſeveral reſpects. And the unity of the Univerſe, or of inferior univerſal Cauſes (as the Sun, or an anima telluris, &c.) are certainly conſiſtent with the ſpecifick and individual differences of the parts.

E. g. Many individual Apples grow on the ſame Tree; yea, Crabs and Apples by divers grafts, nouriſhed on the ſame ſtock: One may rot, or be ſower, and not another. Millions of Trees, as alſo of Herbs and Flowers, good and poyſonous, all grow in the ſame earth. Here is Unity, and great Diverſity. And tho ſelf-moving Animals be not fixed on the earth, no doubr they have a contiguity, or continuity, as parts with the Univerſe. But for all that, a Toad is not a Man, nor a man in torment, undifferenced from another at eaſe, nor a bad man all one with a good.

§. 19. And if any ſhould have a conce[••], That there is nothing but God and matter. I have fully confuted it in the Appendix to Reaſ. of Chriſtian Religion. Matter is no ſuch omnipotent ſapiential thing in it ſelf, as to need no cauſe or maker, any more than Compounds. And to think, that the infinite God would make no nobler Creature than dead matter, no liker himſelf, to glorifie him, is antecedently abſurd, but conſequently notoriouſly falſe. For tho nothing be acted without him, it's evident that he hath made active Natures with a principle of ſelf-moving in themſelves. The Sun differs from a clod, by more than being matter variouſly moved by God, even by a ſelf-moving power alſo. Elſe there were no living creature, but bodies in themſelves dead, animated by God. But it would be too tedious to ſay all againſt this that's to be ſaid.

§. 20. When you tell us of [One life in all, differenc'd only by diverſity of Organs], you mean God, or a common created Soul. If God, I tell you where I have confuted it. It's pity to torment or puniſh God in a murderer, or call him wicked in a wicked man: or that one man ſhould be hang'd, and another prais'd, becauſe the Engines of their bodies are diverſe. But the beſt Anatomiſts ſay, That nothing is to be ſeen in the brain of other Animals, why they might not be as rational as Men. And if it be an Anim[•] creata communis that you mean, either [〈◊〉] think it is a univerſal Soul to the univerſ[••] world, or only to this Earth or Vortex. If to all the World, you feign it to have [〈◊〉] Prerogative. If to part of the world, [〈◊〉] each Vortex, Sun, Star, &c. have a diſt[•••] individuate ſuperior Soul, why not [〈◊〉] ſo inferiors? And why may not millions of individual Spirits conſiſt with more common or univerſal Spirits, as well as the life [〈◊〉] Worms in your belly with yours. That which hath no Soul or Spirit of its own, [〈◊〉] not fit for ſuch reception and communion with ſuperior Spirits, as that which hath. Communion requireth ſome ſimilitude. We ſee God uſeth not all things alike, becauſe he makes them not like.

§. 21. But if the difference between Beaſts, Trees, Stones, and Men, be only the organical contexture of the body; then 1. Either all theſe have but one Soul, and [〈◊〉] are but one, ſave corporeally. 2. Or [〈◊〉] very Stone, Tree and Beaſt hath an Intellectual Soul: for it is evident that man hath by its Operations.

I. Had you made but Virtue and Vice to be only the effects of the bodies contexture, ſure you would only blame the maker [•]f your body, and not your ſelf, for any of your Crimes: For yon did not make your own body, if you were nothing.

Is the common light and ſenſe of Nature no Evidence? Doth not all the world difference Virtue and Vice, moral good and evil? Is it only the difference of an Inſtrument in Tune, and out of Tune? Either then all called ſin is good; or God, or the univerſal Soul, only is to be blamed. Then to call you a Knave, or a Lyar, or Perjured, &c. is no more diſgrace, than to ſay, that you are ſick, or blind. Then all Laws are made only to bind God, or the Amima mundi; and all puniſhment is threatned to God, or this common Soul. And it is God, or the common Soul only in a body, which ſorroweth, feareth, feeleth pain or pleaſure.

II. And if you equal the Souls of Beaſts, Trees, Stones and Men, you muſt make them all to have an Intellectual Soul. If man had not, he could never underſtand. And if they have ſo alſo, fruſtra fit potentia quae nunquam producitur in actum. It is certain that it is not the body (Earth, Air or Water) that feeleth, much leſs that underſtandeth or willeth. If therefore all men have but one Soul, why is it not you that are in pain or joy, when any, or all others are ſo? Tour ſuffering and joys are as much theirs. You hurt your ſelf when you hurt a Malefactor. Why are you not anſwerable for the Crimes of every Thief, if all be one?

§. 22. You vainly liken ſeveral Natures and Faculties to ſeveral pieces of Clock-work, For Natures and Faculties are ſelf-acting Principles under the prime Agent: but a Clock is only paſſive, moved by another: Whether the motus gravitationis in the poiſe, be by an intrinſlck Principle, or by another [〈◊〉] active Nature, is all that's controvertible there. All that your ſimilitude will infer, is this, That as the gravitation of one poiſe, moves every wheel according to its receptive aptitude; ſo God, the univerſal Spirit, moveth all that is moved, according to their ſeveral aptitudes, paſſives as paſſive, actives as active, vitals as ſelf-movers, intellectuals as intellectual-free-ſelf-movers under him. No Art can make a Clock feel, ſee or underſtand.

But if the world have but one ſoul, what mean you by its concentring in the Carcaſs? Is the univerſal Soul there fallen aſleep, or impriſoned in a Grave, or what is it?

§. 23. Add page 5. You well ſay, That Life is the cauſe of all motion: Yea, infinite Life, Wiſdom and Love, is the cauſe of all: but there be ſecond Cauſes under it: Plurima ex uno. And it maketh things various, which it moveth variouſly; and maketh them vital, ſenſitive or mental, which he will move to vital, ſenſitive and mental acts. Operari ſequitur eſſe.

§. 24. You are apt to believe, That thoſe eminent Faculties wherewith men ſeem meer Senſitives, are only the improvement of Speech, and reiterated Acts, till they become Habits.

Anſ. 1. I had a Parrot that ſpoke ſo very plainly, that no Man could diſcern but he could have ſpoke as well as a Man, if he had but had the Intellect of a Man; and quickly would learn new words, but ſhewed no underſtanding of them.

2. Many men born deaf and dumb, are of a ſtrong underſtanding (enquire of a Brother of Sir Richard Dyett's, a Son of Mr. Peter Whalley of Northampton, a Son in Law of the Lord Wharton's, &c.

3. The Faculty and the Habit are Two things. The Faculty is the Eſſential form of the Subſtance. The Habit, or Act, is but an Accident. The Faculty is nothing but the active Power. And the Power goeth before the Act. Doth acting, without Power to act, cauſe the Power? What need you the Power, if you can act without it? And what's a Contradiction, if this be not, to ſay, I do that which I cannot do, or I can do that which I have no power to do? You are not a man without the Faculty, but you are without the Act; or elſe you are no man in your ſleep. The act then is but the Faculties act; and Habits are nothing but the Faculties promptitude to act. And this indeed is cauſed ſometime by very ſtrong acts, and ſometime, and uſually, by frequent acts; and ſometime ſuddenly, by a ſpecial Divine Operation. No doubt, but Oratory, and all Arts and Sciences, are cauſed by frequent acts, and their Objects: But thoſe acts are cauſed by humane Faculties, under God, the firſt Cauſe. You can never cauſe a Carcaſs, or a Parrot, or any Bruit, to think of God, and the glory to come, nor to do any proper humane act.

Credible Hiſtory aſſureth us, That Devils, or ſeparate Souls, have acted Carcaſſes, and diſcourſed in them, and ſeemed to commit Fornication in them, and left them dead behind them; and they were known to be the ſame that were lately executed, or dead, and were re-buried. Here the dead Organ was capable, when a Spirit did but uſe it.

You too much confound Intelléction and Ratiocination. The prime acts of intellective Perception are before Ratiocination. And there are a multitude of Complex Verities, which all ſound men know without Syllogiſms. The diſpoſition to know them, is ſo ſtrong, that ſome call it Actual Knowledg.

§. 25. Add page 6. It's well known, That the Natives in New England, the moſt barbarous Abaſſines, Gallanes, &c. in Ethicpia, have as good natural Capacities as the Europeans. So far are they from being but like Apes and Monkeys; if they be not Ideots, or mad, they ſometime ſhame learned men in their words and deeds. I have known thoſe that have been ſo courſly clad, and ſo clowniſhly bred, even as to Speech, Looks and Carriages, that Gentlemen and Scholars, at the firſt congreſs, have eſteemed them much according to your deſcription, when in Diſcourſe they have proved more ingenious than they. And if improvement can bring them to Arts, the Faculty was there before. When will you ſhew us an Ape or a Monkey, that was ever brought to the Acts or Habits before mentioned of Men? Yea, of thoſe that were born deaf and dumb?

§. 26. Your miſtake of Adam's caſ[••] and Solomon's words, is ſo groſs, that I will not confute it, leſt the deſcription of it offend you.

§. 17. The caſe of failing memories is anſwered before, in the caſe of Infancy and Apop[•]exies, &c. Our memory faileth in our ſleep: and yet when we awake, we find that there remains the ſame knowledg of Arts and Sciences. They did not end at night, and were not all new made tne next morning. The Acts ceaſed, becauſe the receptivity of the paſſive Organ ceaſed: but the Habit and Faculty continued. And when memory in old men faileth about names, and words, and little matters, their judgments about great things are uſually ſtronger (by better Habits) than young mens.

§. 28. You ſay, You know nothing wherein Man excels Beasts, but may be referred to the benefit of ſpeech and hands, capable of effecting its Conceptions.

Anſ. This is anſwered before. Thoſe Conceptions are the cauſe of words and actions: and is there no cauſe of thoſe Conceptions? And if mans Conceptions differ from the beaſts, the cauſes differed. And if the firſt Conceptions did not differ, the Subſequent would not differ neither, without a difference in the cauſal Faculties. Why do not Beaſts ſpeak as well as Men? Parrots ſhew, That it is not in all for want of a ſpeaking Organ. If one be born dumb, and not deaf, he will know but little the leſs for his dumbneſs. If he be born deaf and dumb, and not blind, he will ſtill be rational, as Dr. Wallis can tell you, who hath taught ſuch to talk and converſe intelligibly by their fingers, and other ſigns, without words. I confeſs, if all the outward Senſes were ſtopt from the Birth, I ſee not how the Soul could know outward ſenſible things, as being no Objects to it. And how it would work on it ſelf alone, we know not; but underſtand, and will, we are ſure it doth: and therefore can do it. And it's one thing to prove Beaſts to be men, or rational, and another thing to prove Men to be Beaſts, or irrational. If you could prove the former, viz. That Beaſts have Souls that can think of God, and the Life to come, if they could but ſpeak, this would rather prove them immortal, than prove man unreaſonable, or of a mortal Soul. Your whole ſpeech makes more to advance bruits, than to deny the reaſon of man.

§. 29. You ſay, You know no better way to attain a right knowledg of our ſelves, than by beholding our ſelves in Adam, and enquiring what Nature had endued him with, which will fall far ſhort of what we now admire in our ſelves.

Anſw. 1. As a multitude of Objects, and Experiences, more tend to Wiſdom than one alone; ſo to know both what Adam was, and what all men are, and do, doth evidence more to our information, than to know Adam's firſt Caſe alone.

2. Adam's firſt Powers are to be known by his acts; and his acts were not to be done at once, in a minute, or a day: And we have not the Hiſtory of his Life much after his Fall. But we may be ſure, that Adam's Nature in Innocency, was no baſer than ours corrupted. And therefore Adam had the Powers of doing whatever other men ſince have done.

3. But let us come to your Teſt: 1. Adam was made a living Soul by the breath of God, after the making of his body of the earth.

2. Adam and Eve were bleſſed with a generative multiplying Faculty: but they did not generate God; nor did every bruit that had alſo that Faculty. Therefore there is a Soul which is not God, in every Animal, (nor yet an Univerſal Soul).

3. Adam, no doubt, could not know external ſenſible Objects, till they were brought within the reach of his ſenſe: no more can we.

4. Adam knew the Creatures as ſoon as he ſaw them; and gave them Names ſuitable. This is more than we could ſo ſoon do.

5. Adam had a Law given him; and therefore knew that God was his Ruler. He knew that God was to be obeyed; he knew what was his Law: elſe it had been no ſin to break it. He knew that he ought to love, and believe, and truſt God, and cleave to him: elſe it bad been no ſin to forſake him, and to believe the Tempter, and to love the forbidden Fruit better than God. He knew that Death was the threatned Wages of Sin. In a word, He was made in the Image of God: And Paul tells us, it is that Image into which we are renewed by Chriſt: And he deſcribeth it to conſiſt in wiſdom, righteouſneſs, and true holineſs.

6. And we have great reaſon to think, that it was Adam that taught Abel to offer Sacrifice in Faith, and delivered to his Poſterity the Traditions which he had from God. Tho Adam did not do all this at once, he did not receive a new Soul or Faculty for every new act. Can Apes and Monkeys do all this? Doth God give them Laws to know and keep as moral free-agents?

But you ſay, Adam knew not that he was naked. Anſ. What! and yet knew God and his Law, and how to name the Creatures, and how to dreſs and keep the Garden? He knew not that nakedneſs was ſhameful; for he had newly made it ſhameful.

Perhaps you think of Adam's forbidden deſire of knowledg, and his miſerable attainment of it. But that did not make him a new Soul, that had no ſuch Faculty before. Adam was the Son of God by Creation, Luk. 3. and it was his duty and intereſt to live as a Son, in abſolute truſt on his Fathers care and love: and inſtead of this, he was tempted to ſelf-dependance, and muſt needs know more than his duty, & his fathers love and reward: He muſt know good and evil for himſelf: like a Child that muſt know what Food, and Rayment, and Work is fitteſt for him, which he ſhould know only by truſting his Fa[•]thers choice; or as a Patient that muſt needs know every Ingredient in his Phyſick, and the Nature and Reaſon of it, before he will take it, when he ſhould implicitly truſt his Phyſician. Man ſhould have waited on God for all his Notices, and ſought to know no more than he revealed. But a diſtruſtful, and a ſelfiſh knowledg, and buſy enquiring into unrevealed things, is become our ſin and miſery.

§. 36. You ſay, Suppoſe all this anſwered: what will it avail, as to a life of Retribution, if all return to one element, and be there immerged as Brooks and Rivers in the Sea, and we loſe our individuation.

Anſ. I anſwer'd this in the Appendix to the Reaſ. of the Chriſtian Religion. I add 1. Do you believe, that each one hath now one individual Soul, or not? If not, how can we loſe that which we never had? If we have but all one univerſal mover, which moveth us as Engines, as the Wind and Water move Mills, how come ſome motions to be ſo ſwift (as a Swallow), and others ſo ſlow, or none at all; in as mobile a body)? Yea, how cometh motion to be ſo much in our Power, that we can ſit ſtill when we will, and riſe, and go, and run, and ſpeak when we will, and ceaſe, or change it when we will? A ſtone that falls, or an arrow that is ſhot, cannot do ſo. Sure it is ſome inward formal Principle; and not a material Mechanical mobility of the matter, which can cauſe this difference.

Indeed if we have all but one Soul, it's eaſie to love our Neighbours as our ſelves, becauſe our Neighbours are our ſelves. But it's as eaſie to hate our ſelves as our Enemies, and the good as the bad, if all be one (for forma dat nomen & eſſe). But it's ſtrange, that either God, or the Soul of the World, ſhall hate it ſelf, and put it ſelf to pain, and fight againſt it ſelf, as in Wars, &c.

But if you think ſtill, That there is nothing but God and dead matter actuated by him, I would beg your Anſwer to theſe few Queſtions.

1. Do you really believe, that there is a God? that is, an eternal infinite ſelf-being, who hath all that power, knowledg, and goodneſs of will, in tranſcendent Eminency, which any Creature hath formally, and is the efficient Governor of all elſe that is. If not, all the world condemneth you: for it is not an uncauſed Being, and can have nothing but from its Cauſe, who can give nothing greater than it ſelf.

2. Do you think this God can make a Creature that hath a ſubordinate Soul, or Spirit, to be the Principle of its own Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition, or not? Cannot God make a Spirit? If not, it is either becauſe it is a Contradiction (which none can pretend), or becauſe God is not Omnipotent; that is, is not God; and ſo there is no God; and ſo you deny what you granted. But if God can make a Spirit,

3. Why ſhould you think he would not? Some of your mind ſay, That he doth all the good that he can; or elſe he were not perfectly good. Certainly his goodneſs is equal to his greatneſs, and is commmunicative.

4. Hath he not imprinted his Perfections in ſome meaſure, in his Works? Do they not ſhew his glory? Judg of his Greatneſs by the Sun, Stars, and Heavens; and of his Wiſdom, by the wonderful Order, Contexture, and Goverument of all things. Even the Fabrick of a Fly, or any Animal, poſeth us. And do you think, that his love and goodneſs hath no anſwerable effect?

5. Do you think, that paſſive matter doth as much manifeſt Gods Perfection, and honour the Efficient, as vital and Intellectual Spirits? If it be a far nobler Work for God to make a free, vital, mental Spirit, to act under him freely, mentally, and vitally, than to make meer atomes, why ſhould you think that God will not do it?

6. And do you not diſhonour, or blaſpheme the prime Cauſe, by ſuch diſhonouring of his Work, as to ſay, he never made any thing more noble than Atomes, and Compoſitions of them.

7. Is there not in the Creature a communicative diſpoſition to cauſe their like? Animals generate their like: Fire kindleth fire: Wiſe men would make others wiſe: God is eſſential infinite Life, Wiſdom and Love: and can he, or would he make nothing liker to himſelf than dead Atomes? Yea, you feign him to make nothing but by Compoſition, while you ſay, That matter it ſelf is eternal.

8. But when the matter of Fact is evident, and we ſee by the actions, that there is a difference between things moved by God, ſome having a created Life and mind, and ſome none, what needs then any further proof?

§. 31. But if you hold, That we have now diſtinct Spirits, which are individual Subſtances, why ſhould you fear the loſs of our individuation, any more than our annihilation, or ſpecifick alteration? If God made as many ſubſtantial individual Souls, as men, is there any thing in Nature or Scripture, which thteatneth the loſs of Individuation? I have ſhewed you, and ſhall further ſhew you enough againſt it.

§. 32. You ſay, page 7. Every thing returneth to its element, and loſeth its individuation: Earth to Earth, Water to the Sea, the Spirit to God that gave it. What happineſs then can we hope for more than deliverance from the preſent calamity; or what miſery are we capable of, more than is common to all?

Anſ. 1. Bodies loſe but their Compoſition, and Spiritual forms. Do you think, that any Atome loſeth its individuation? If it be ſtill diviſible in partes infinitas, it is infinite. And if every Atome be infinite, it is as much, or more than all the world; and ſo is no part of the world; and ſo there would be as many Worlds, or Infinites, as Atomes. It is but an aggregative motion which you mention. Birds of a Feather will flock together, and yet are Individuals ſtill. Do you think any duſt, or drop, any Atome of Earth or Water, loſeth any thing of it ſelf, by its union with the reſt? Is any Subſtance loſt? Is the ſimple Nature changed? Is it not Earth and Water ſtill? Is not the Haecceity, as they call it, continued? Doth not God know every duſt, and every drop from the reſt? Can he not ſeparate them when he will? And if Nature in all things tend to aggregation, or union, it is then the Perfection of every thing. And why ſhould we fear Perfection?

2. But Earth, and Water, and Air, are partible matter. Earth is eaſily ſeparable: The parts of Water more hardly, by the means of ſome terrene Separaror: The parts of Air yet more hardly: and the Sun-beams, or ſubſtance of fire, yet harder than that (tho it's contraction and effects are very different): And Spirits either yet harder, or not at all. Some make it eſſential to them to be indiſcerptible; and all muſt ſay, That there is nothing in the Nature of them, tending to diviſion, or ſeparation. And therefore tho God, who can annihilate them, can divide them into parts, if it be no Contradiction; yet it will never be, becauſe he uſeth every thing according to its nature, till he cometh to miracles. Therefore their diſſilution of parts is no more to be feared, than their annihilation.

3. But if you take Souls to be partible and unible, then you muſt ſuppoſe every part to have ſtill its own exiſtence in the whole. And do you think, that this doth not more advance Souls than abaſe them? Yea, you ſeem to Deifie them; while you make them all to return into God, as drops into the Sea. And if you feign God to be partible, is it not more honour and joy to be a part of God, who is joy it ſelf, than to be a created Soul? If a thouſand Candles were put out, and their light turned into one Luminary, as great as they all, every part would have its ſhare in the enlightning of the place about it. Is it any loſs to a ſingle Soldier, to become part of a victorious Army.

4. But indeed this is too high a Glory for the Soul of man to deſire, or hope for. It is enough to have a bleſſed union with Chriſt, and the holy Society, conſiſtent with our Individuation. Like will to like, and yet be it ſelf. Rivers go to the Sea, and not to the Earth. Earth turns to Earth, and not to the Sun, or Fire. And the holy and bleſſed, go to the holy and bleſſed: And I believe, that their union will be nearer than we can now well conceive, or than this ſelfiſh ſtate of man deſireth: But as every drop in the Sea, is the ſame Water it was, ſo every Soul will be the ſame Soul.

2. And as to the incapacity of miſery which you talk of, why ſhould you think it more hereafter than here? If you think all Souls now to be but one, doth not an aking Tooth, or a gouty Foot, or a calculous Bladder, ſuffer pain, tho it be not the body that feeleth; but the ſame ſenſitive Soul is pain'd in one part, and pleas'd in another. And if all Souls be now but God in divers Bodies, or the Anima mundi, try if you can comfort a man under the torment of the Stone, or other Malady, or on the Rack, or in terror of Conſcience, by telling him, That his Soul is a part of God. Will this make a Captive bear his Captivity, or a Malefactor his Death? If not here, why ſhould you think that their miſery hereafter will be ever the leſs, or more tolerable for your conceit, that they are parts of God? They will be no more parts of him then, than they were here. But it's like, that they alſo will have an uniting inclination, even to ſuch as themſelves; or that God, will ſeparate them from all true unity, and ſay, Go you curſed into everlaſting fire, prepared for the Devil and his Angels, &c.

§. 33. No doubt it's true, that you ſay, page 7, and 8. That matter is ſtill the ſame, and liable to all the changes which you mention. But it's an unchanged God, who doth all this by Spirits, as ſecond Cauſes, who are not of ſuch a changeable, diſſoluble, partible nature, as Bodies are: It is Spirits that do all that's done in the world. And I conjecture, as well as you, That univerſal Spirits are univerſal Cauſes. I ſuppoſe, That this Earth hath a vegitative form, which maketh it as a matrix to receive the Seeds, and the more active influx of the Sun. But Earth and Sun are but general Cauſes. Only God, and the ſeminal Virtue, cauſe the ſpecies, as ſuch. The Sun cauſeth every Plant to grow; but it cauſeth not the difference between the Roſe, and the Nettle▪ and the Oak. The wonderful unſearchable Virtue of the Seed cauſeth that. And if you would know that Virtue, you muſt know it by the effects. You cannot tell by the Seed only of a Roſe, a Vine, an Oak, what is in it. But when you ſee the Plants in ripeneſs, you may ſee that the Seeds had a ſpecifying Virtue, by the influx of the general Cauſe, to bring forth thoſe Plants, Flowers, &c. Neither can you know what is in the Egg, but by the ripe Bird; nor what the Soul of an Infant is, but by Manhood and its Acts.

§. 34. You here pag. 7. divert from the point of the Immortality or Nature of the Soul, to that of the Reſurrection of the Body: of which I will now ſay but this; Chriſt roſe, and hath promiſed us a Reſurrection, and nothing is difficult to God. [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] oft ſignifieth our living another life after this. The Body hath more parts than Earth and Water. The Spirits as we call them, which are the igneous parts, lodged in the pureſt aereal in the blood, &c. are that body in and by which the Soul doth operate on the reſt. How much of theſe material Spirits the Soul may retain with it after Death, we know not: and if it have ſuch a body▪ it hath partly the ſame; and God can make what Addition he pleaſe, which ſhall not contradict identity: Paul ſaith of Corn, God giveth it a body as pleaſeth him, in ſome reſpect the ſame, &c. in ſome not the ſame that was ſown. We do not hold, That all the fleſh that ever a man had, ſhall be raiſed as that mans. If one man that was fat, grow lean in his ſickneſs, we do not ſay, that all the fleſh that ſickneſs waſted, ſhall riſe: It ſhall riſe a ſpiritual body. God knoweth that which you and I know not.

§. 35. You add, how eaſie it would have been to you to believe as the Church believeth, and not to have immerged your ſelf in theſe difficulties?

Anſ. 1. The Church is nothing but all individual Chriſtians; and it is their Belief which makes them capable of being of the Church: As we muſt be men in order of Nature, before we are a Kingdom of men; ſo we are Believers before we are a Church of Believers. A Kingdom or Policy maketh us not men, but is made of men; and Church-ſociety or Policy maketh us not Believers, but is made up of Believers. Therefore Belief is firſt, and is not cauſed by that which followeth it? And why doth the Church believe? Is it becauſe they believe?

And whom do they believe? Is it themſelves? I doubt you have fallen into acquaintance with thoſe whoſe Intereſt hath made it their Trade to puzzle and confound men about things as hard to themſelves as others, that they may bring them to truſt the Church, and then tell them that it's they that are that Church, as a neceſſary means to the quieting their minds. And they tell them, You are never able by reaſon to comprehend the myſteries of Faith; the more you ſearch, the more you are confounded. But if you believe as the Church believeth, you ſhall ſpeed as the Church ſpeedeth., But it's one thing to believe the ſame thing which the Church believeth; and another to believe it with the ſame faith, and upon the ſame Authority. If a man believe all the Articles of the Creed only becauſe men tell him that they are true, it is but a human Faith, as reſting only on mans Authority; but the true Members of the Church believe all the ſame things, becauſe God revealeth and attesteth them; and this is a Divine Faith: And ſo muſt you.

If you love light more than darkneſs and deceit, diſtinguiſh, 1. Believing men for Authority. 2. Believing men for their Honeſty, 3. Believing men▪ for the natural impoſſibility of their deceiving.

And the foundation of this difference is here: Mans Soul hath two ſorts of acts, Neceſſary and Contingent, or mutably free.

To love our ſelves, to be unwilling to be miſerable, and willing to be happy; to love God as good, if known, &c. are acts of the Soul as neceſſary, as for fire to burn combuſtible contiguous matter; or for a Bruit to eat; ſo that all the Teſtimonies which is produced by theſe neceſſary acts by knowing men, hath a Phyſical certainty, the contrary being impoſſible. And this is infallible hiſtorical knowledg of matter of fact. Thus we know there is ſuch a City as Rome, Paris, Venice, &c. and that there was ſuch a man as K. James, Ed. 6. Hen. 8. William the Conqueror, &c. And that the Statutes now aſcribed to Ed. 3. and other Kings and their Parliaments are genuine. For Judges judge by them; Lawyers plead them, Kings own them, all men hold their Eſtates and Lives by them. Contrary mens Intereſt by Lawyers are daily pleaded by them againſt each other; and if any one would deny, forge or corrupt a Statute▪ Intereſt would engage the reſt againſt him to detect his fraud.

1. The certain effect of natural neceſſary Cauſes hath natural neceſſary evidence of Truth.

But when all knowing men of contrary Diſpoſitions and Intereſts. acknowledg a thing true, this is the effect of nataral neceſſary Cauſes.

Ergo it hath natural neceſſary evidence of Truth.

2. It is impoſſible there ſhould be an Effect without a ſufficient Cauſe.

But that a thing ſhould be falſe which all knowing men of contrary Diſpoſitions and Intereſts acknowledg to be true, would be an Effect without a Cauſe; for there is no Cauſe in nature to effect it. It is impoſſible in nature that all men in England ſhould agree to ſay, There was a King James, K. Edward, Q. Mary, or that theſe Statutes were made by them, if it were falſe. This is infallible Hiſtorical Teſtimony. It were not ſo ſtrong if it were only by one Party, and not by Enemies alſo, or men of contrary Minds and Intereſts. And thus we know the Hiſtory of the Goſpel; and this Tradition is naturally infallible.

II. But all the Teſtimony which dependeth on humane Acts, not neceſſary, but free, have but an uncertain moral humane Credibility. For ſo all men are Lyars; i.e. fallible, and not fully to be truſted.

And I. Thoſe Teſtimonies which depend on mens Honeſty, are no farther credible, than we know the Honeſty of the men: which in ſome is great, in ſome is [〈◊〉], in moſt is mixt, and lubricous, and doubtful, Alas! what abundance of falſe Hiſtory is in the world! Who can truſt the Honeſty of ſuch men, as multitudes of Popes, Prelates, and Prieſts have been? Will they ſtick at a Lye, that ſtick not at Blood, or any wickedneſs? Beſides, the ignorance which invalidates their Teſtimony.

II. And to pretend Authority to rule our Faith, is the moſt unſatisfactory way of all. For before you can believe that Jeſus is the Chriſt, and his Word true, how many impoſſibilities have you to believe? 1. You muſt believe that Chriſt hath a Church. 2. And hath authorized them to determine what is to be believed, before you believe that he is Chriſt. 3. You muſt know who they be whom you muſt believe; whether all, or ſome, or a major vote. Whether out of all the world, or a party. 4. And how far their Authority extendeth? Whether to judg whether there be a God, or no God; a Chriſt, or no Chriſt; a Heaven, or none; a Goſpel, or none: or what. 5. And how their determinations out of all the world may come with certainty to us: and where to find them. 6. And when Countreys and Councils contradict and condemn each other, which is to be believed. Many ſuch impoſſibilities in the Roman way, muſt be believed, before a m[•]n can believe that Jeſus is the Chriſt. In a word, you muſt not puzzle your head to know what a man is, or whether he have an immortal ſoul; but you muſt, 1. believe the Church of Believers, before you are a Believer in Chriſt. 2. And you muſt believe, that Chriſt was God and Man, and came to ſave man, before you believe that there is ſuch a creature as man, or what he is, and whether he have a ſoul capable of ſalvation. But I have oft elſewhere opened theſe Abſurdities and Contradictions; where you may ſee them confuted, if you are willing.

§. 36. Your queſtion about the ſouls nature, exiſtence, and Individuation, may be reſolved by a ſurer and eaſier way: as followeth:

I. By your own certain experience.

1. You perceive that you ſee, feel, underſtand, will and execute. 2. You may know, as is oft ſaid, that therefore you have an active power to do theſe. 3. You may thence know, that it is a ſubſtance which hath that power. Nothing can do nothing. 4. You may perceive, that it is not the terrene ſubſtance, but an inviſible ſubſtance, actuating the body. 5. You may know, that there is no probability, that ſo noble a ſubſtance ſhould be annihilated. 6. Or that a pure and ſimple ſubſtance ſhould be diſſolved by the ſeparation of parts (or if that were, every part would be a ſpirit ſtill). 7. You have no cauſe to ſuſpect, that this ſubſtance ſhould loſe thoſe powers or faculties which are its eſſential form, and be turned into ſome other ſpecies, or thing. 8. And you have as little cauſe to ſuſpect, that an eſſential vital intellective power, will not be active, when active inclination is its Eſſence. 9. You have no cauſe to ſuſpect, that it will want Objects to action in a World of ſuch variety of Objects. 10. And you have as little cauſe to ſuſpect, that it will be unactive, for want of Organs, when God hath made its Eſſence active; and either can make new Organs; or that which can act on matter, can act without, or on other matter. He that can play on a Lute, can do ſomewhat as good, if that be broken. 11. And experience might ſatisfie you, that ſeveral men have ſeveral ſouls, by the ſeveral and contrary Operations. 12. And you have no reaſon to ſuſpect, that God will turn many, from being many▪ into one; or that unity ſhould be any of their loſs. All this, Reaſon tells you, beginning at your own experience, as I have (and elſewhere more fully) opened.

§. 37. II. And you have at hand ſenſible proof of the individuation of ſpirits, by Witches, Contracts, and Apparitions: of which the world has unqueſtionable proof, tho there be very many Cheats. Read Mr. Glanvill's new Book, publiſhed by Dr. Moore, Lavater de Spectris, Zanchy de Angilii, Manlii Collect. Bodin's Daemonolog. Remigius of Witches, beſides all the Mallei Malificorum, and doubt if you can. If you do, I can give you yet more, with full proof.

§. 38. III. But all that I have ſaid to you, is but the leaſt part, in compariſon of the aſſurance which you may have by the full revelats on of Jeſus Chriſt, who hath brought life and immortality to light in the Goſpel▪ where the ſtate, the doom, the rewards and puniſhment of ſouls is aſſerted.

And without dark and long Ambages, or Roman Juggles, we prove the truth of this Goſpel, briefly and infallibly thus:

I. The Hiſtory of Chriſt's Life, Miracles, Doctrine, Death, Reſurrection, Aſcenſion, the Apoſtles Miracles, &c. is proved by ſuch forementioned evidence, as hath phyſical certainty: Not ſuch as dependeth only on mens honeſty, or moral argument, much leſs on a pretended determining authority; but ſuch as dependeth on neceſſary acts of man, even the conſent of all ſorts of contrary minds and intereſts, as we know the Statutes of the Land, or other certain Hiſtory. But we are ſo far from needing to ask, which part of Chriſtians it is that is this Church, that is to be believed, that it tendeth to the aſſertaining of us, that all the Chriſtian World, Papiſts, Proteſtants, Greeks, Moſcovites, Armenians, Jacobites, Neſtorians, &c. herein agree, even while they oppoſe each other. To know whether there was a Julius, or Auguſtus Caeſar, a Virgil, Ovid Cicero, and which are their Works; yea, which are the Acts of Councils▪ no man goeth to an authorized determining Judg for the matter of Fact, but to hiſtorical proof. And this we have moſt full.

II. And if the History be true, the Doctrine muſt needs be true, ſeeing it is fully proved by the matters of Fact. Chriſt being proved to be Chriſt, all his words muſt needs be true.

§. 39. The Goſpel of Chriſt, hath theſe four parts of its infallible evidence.

I. The antecedent and inhererent Prophecies fulfilled.

II. The inherent impreſs of Divinity on the Goſpel it ſelf, unimitable by man. It hath Gods Image and Superſcription; and its Excellency, propria luce, is diſcernible.

III. All the Miracles, and Reſurrection, and Aſcention of Chriſt, the Gift of his Spirit, and extraordinary Miracles of the Apoſtles, and firſt Churches.

IV. The ſanctifying work of the Spirit by this Goſpel, on all Believers in all Ages of the World, by which they have the Witneſs in themſelves. A full conſtant unimitable Teſtimony.

§. 40. And now how highly ſoever you think of Bruits, think not too baſely of Men, for whom Chriſt became a Saviour: And yet think not ſo highly of Men, Bruits and Stones, as to think that they are God. And think not that your true diligence hath confounded you, but either your negligence, or ſeducers, or the unhappy ſtifling of obvious truth, by the ill ordering of your thoughts. And I beſeech you remember, that Gods Revelationt are ſuited to mans uſe, and our true knowledg to his Revtlations. He hath not told us all that man would know, but what we muſt know. Nothing is more known to us than that of God which is neceſſary for us: Yet nothing ſo incomprehenſible as God. There is much of the Nature of Spirits, and the world to come, unſearchable to us, which will poſe all our Wits: yet we have ſufficient certainty of ſo much as tells us our duty and our hopes. God hath given us Souls to uſe, and to know only ſo far as is uſeful. He that made your Watch, taught not you how it's made; but how to uſe it. Inſtead therefore of your concluding complaints of your condition, thank God, who hath made man capable to ſeek him, ſerve him, love him, prai[•]e him, and rejoyce in hope of promiſed Perfection. Live not as a willful ſtranger to your Soul and God. Uſe faithfully the Faculties which he hath given you: ſin not willfully againſt the truth revealed, and leave things ſecret to God, till you come into the clearer light: and you ſhall have no cauſe to complain, that God▪ whoſe goodneſs is equal to his greatneſs, hath dealt hardly with mankind. Inſtead of truſting fallible man, truſt Chriſt, who hath fully proved his truſtineſs; and his Spirit will advance you to higher things than bruits are capable of. God be merciful to us dark unthankful ſinners▪

Mar. 14. 1681.

Ri. Baxter.

ERRATA.

IN the Second Part, p▪ 12. l. 9. for primus r. Primae p. 16. l. 21. for is r. are.

I have not leiſure to gather the reſt, if there be any.

Marginal notes

1. Here [〈◊〉] wha[•] wan[•] [〈◊〉] the [〈◊〉] Cop[•] ↩